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Foreword
Over	 the	 past	 decade,	 the	 boom	 in	 commodity	 prices,	 global	 imbalances	
between	savings	and	investment	in	major	countries	and	the	massive	accumulation	
of	 foreign	 exchange	 reserves	 have	 resulted	 in	 the	 rise	 of	 Sovereign	 Wealth	
Funds	(SWF)	as	major	forces	on	international	financial	markets	and	the	global	
economy.	In	2011,	according	to	the	SWF	Institute,	the	largest	Sovereign	Wealth	
Funds	manage	well	 over	$4	 trillion	 in	assets.	The	growing	 influence	of	SWFs	
has	far-reaching	consequences	for	both	host	and	sponsoring	countries.	On	the	
one	hand,	SWFs	can	play	a	positive	role	by	financing	development	projects	and	
serving	 as	 an	 instrument	 to	 shield	 economies	 against	 shocks.	 	 On	 the	 other	
hand,	the	economic	weight	of	SWFs	may	hamper	the	implementation	of	effective	
macroeconomic	policies	and	create	additional	opportunities	for	corruption	in	the	
sponsoring	 countries.	 Furthermore,	 the	 economic	 reach	 of	 SWFs	 engenders	
concerns	about	the	potential	destabilization	of	financial	markets	in	host	countries.	
Some	Western	governments	are	also	concerned	about	transparency	and	politically	





The	 recent	 global	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2008-09	 elevated	 the	 importance	 of	
SWFs	 and	 temporarily	 shifted	 the	 focus	 of	 SWFs	 from	 long	 term	 investment	
issues	 to	 short-term	 economic	 stabilization.	 SWFs	 have	 helped	 to	 stabilize	
economies	 in	a	various	countries	such	as	Chile,	Kazakhstan	and	Russia;	and	
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Sovereign Wealth Funds as the emerging players in the 
global financial arena: 





















investments	 from	 the	 latter	 into	developed	economies.	 In	 this	 reality	 the	need	
becomes	apparent	 for	a	 thorough	and	profound	understanding	and	discussion	
on	the	governance	of	the	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	at	the	domestic	level,	on	the	
accountability	of	 the	saving	and	 the	spending	decisions	 to	 the	citizens	and	on	
the	role	of	the	legislative	bodies	in	overseeing	the	management	of	the	Sovereign	





domestic	 economies.	 In	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 ongoing	 financial	 crisis,	 financial	
liquidity	constraints	may	force	even	those	countries	that	have	been	successful	
so	 far	 to	 resort	 to	 this	 type	of	 investment.	Besides,	 the	 fact	 that	 these	assets	
are	possessed	by	economically	unstable	and	politically	unpredictable	countries	
causes	serious	concerns	by	the	world	community.	
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The	nature	of	the	investment	policy	of	the	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	substantially	
changes	during	 (and	possibly	 after)	 financial	 turmoil.	 If	 previously	 the	 primary	
goal	 of	 the	 Sovereign	Wealth	 Funds	 was	 considered	 to	 be	 the	 transparency	
of	windfall	 funds	and	 their	preferable	management	abroad,	at	 the	present	and	
in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 exigency	 to	 stimulate	 the	 economy	 in	 natural-resource-rich	
countries,	the	management	of	these	assets	domestically	becomes	an	imperative.	
This	 in	 its	 turn	 can	 darken	 the	 actual	 evaluation	 of	 the	 government	 on	 the	
withdrawal	of	the	country	out	of	the	crisis	and	worsen	the	problem	of	ensuring	the	
accountability	of	public	finance	management,	thus	increasing	unlimited	transfers	
and	bailout	plans.	Thus,	 the	ongoing	crisis	considerably	changes	 the	 role	and	
the	philosophy	of	the	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	and	it	introduces	the	need	for	a	
thorough	understanding	of	these	institutions.	The most important impediment 
to the understanding of the Sovereign Wealth Fund remains the absence 
of the precise institutional as well as procedural limitations capable of 
decreasing the government’s appetite to waste financial funds within the 




to	 the	 state	 budget	 leads	 to	 adverse	 impacts	 for	 macroeconomic	 equilibrium	
and	 has	 comprehensive	 socio-economic	 consequences	 such	 as	 rent-seeking	
effects,	social	inequality,	ineffective	decision	making	and	emergence	of	economic	
authoritarian	governance.	
Taking	 the	 above	 into	 consideration,	 the	 immediate	 need	 becomes	 clear	
for	a	careful	 investigation	and	clarification	of	 the	 role	of	 the	Sovereign	Wealth	
Funds,	 of	 their	 nature	 and	 operational	 aspects,	 of	 the	 determinants	 of	 their	
investment	strategies	and	the	interaction	of	the	latter	with	the	recipient	countries.	
All	of	the	latter	cannot	be	assessed	without	looking	at	governance	aspects	of	the	
Sovereign	Wealth	 Funds	 and	without	 setting	 some	generally	 accepted	 quality	







categorization	 of	 the	 latter.	 Section	 2	 looks	 into	 the	 risk	 types	 that	 Sovereign	
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2. Sovereign Wealth Funds: 
A crucial element of the world economy
Global	 imbalances	 deriving	 from	 large	 current	 account	 deficits	 in	 major	
economies	 like	 that	of	 the	USA	and	counterbalancing	 large	surpluses	 in	Asian	
and	 oil-producing	 countries	 have	 attracted	 significant	 attention.	 These	 have	
boosted	 the	 foreign	 reserves	 of	many	 surplus	 countries	 clearly	 beyond	 levels	
seen	as	necessary	 for	securing	 their	 international	 liquidity.	Decision-makers	 in	
the	surplus	countries	are	seeking	to	increase	the	return	on	their	“excess”	reserves	






SWFs’	 design,	 establishment,	 operation	 and	 investment	management	 and	
allocation	 are	 receiving	 an	 increasing	 amount	 of	 interest	 on	 national	 as	 well	
as	 international	 levels.	The	relatively	new	and	unclear	operations	of	the	SWFs	
urge	 greater	 investigation	 and	 clarification	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 SWFs	 as	well	
as	 of	 their	 importance	 to	 and	 interaction	 with	 international	 financial	 markets.	
The	exploration	of	SWFs	emerges	as	of	primary	 importance	when	considering	
the	 ongoing	 financial	 crisis,	 where	 the	 SWFs	 emerge	 as	 key	 players	 in	 the	
international	financial	arena.	Understanding the nature of the SWFs remains 
particularly important especially after considering the high degree of 
misconception, confusion and consequent skepticism around the SWFs. 
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Figure 1. Regional distributions of official reserves in 1996 and 2006 
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In	 all	 cases,	 SWFs	 are	 a	 new	 source	 of	 political	 intrigue	 and	 concern	
emerging	for	many	as	one	of	the	hottest	topics	in	global	financial	markets.	In	any	
respect,	 SWFs	 are	 reshaping	 the	 economic	 and	 political	 landscape.	Although	
concerns	about	emerging	market	 investors	are	not	novel,	SWFs	do	appear	 to	
have	 attracted	 special	 attention	 from	 policymakers.	 Explorations	 of	 the	 latter	
have	 resulted	 in	new	policy	proposals	 for	dealing	with	SWFs	being	at	various	
stages	of	consideration	and	implementation	(for	example,	the	U.S.	has	created	a	
SWF	task	force	to	consider	its	options,	Australia	and	Germany	have	implemented	









2.1. Understanding SWFs: 
Definitions, nature, financial and regional features
A general definition of SWFs would state that SWFs are government 
owned investment funds operating in private financial markets.	 Recent	
interest	in	SWFs	has	failed	to	come	to	a	consensus	as	to	how	SWFs	differ	from	
other	public	 investment	 funds	and	how	they	should	be	defined.	 Indeed,	SWFs	
differ	 in	 ownership,	 underlying	 assets,	 degree	 of	 dependence,	 operational	
aspects,	etc.	From	 the	existing	SWFs,	some	are	 funded	 from	fiscal	 surpluses	
or	foreign	exchange	reserves,	while	others	are	funded	from	borrowings	from	the	
market.	Of	 the	 existing	 SWFs,	 almost	 half	 operate	 as	 separate	 legal	 entities,	









•	 Who owns the SWF? 
An	 overview	 of	 the	 existing	 SWFs	 reveals	 that	 governments,	 at	 central	








•	 What are the liabilities of the SWF?
When	 considering	 this	 question	 the	 interesting	 finding	 is	 that	 SWFs	 have	
no	direct	 liabilities.	Several	SWFs	have	 liabilities,	 such	as	sterilization	debt	or	
some	deferred	contractual	liability	to	transfer	money	out	of	the	fund	and	into	the	
general	budget	or	a	social	security	system.	Nevertheless,	it	appears	that	SWFs	
have	no	non-governmental	 or	 outside	 liabilities.	For	 those	 funds	 that	 do	have	






•	 Who benefits from the SWF?
Despite	 certain	 explicit	 goals	 (e.g.	 financing	 future	 pension	 payment	
requirements),	 SWFs	 are	 managed	 according	 to	 the	 interests	 and	 objectives	
of	 the	government	and/or	 the	sovereign.	The	final	beneficiary	of	a	SWF	 is	not	
a	 specific	 individual,	 but	 rather	 it	 remains	 the	 government,	 the	 host	 country’s	
citizens	or	the	taxpayer	in	general.
Figure 2. World map of SWFs and respective SWFs volume










among	other	 elements,	 foreign	 currency	 reserve	assets	held	by	 the	monetary	
authorities	for	the	traditional	balance	of	payments	or	monetary	policy	purposes,	
state-owned	enterprises	in	the	traditional	sense,	government-employee	pension	
funds,	or	assets	managed	for	 the	benefit	of	 individuals.	SWFs are commonly 
established out of a balance of payment surpluses, official foreign currency 
operations, the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts 
resulting from commodity exports.	While	SWF	is	an	all-encompassing	term,	it	
describes	a	group	of	heterogeneous	funds	existing	and	operating	for	years.	What	
remains	common	 to	 the	group	of	 these	 funds	 is	 the	public	ownership	and	 the	
fact	that	these	funds	are	often	established	to	meet	a	macroeconomic	purpose,	








“optimal.”	When	 taking	 this	 into	 consideration	 the	presence	and	 the	operation	
of	 an	 SWF	 is	 primarily	 linked	 to	 whether	 the	 country	 has	 an	 “adequate”	 or	
“optimal”	 level	 of	 international	 reserves.	 Even	 if	 the	 level	 is	 “ample”	 enough,	





this	reality,	 the	 identification	of	 the	operational	objectives	 is	needed	in	order	to	
derive	an	appropriate	 investment	policy	 that	will	envisage	 funding,	withdrawal,	
and	spending	 rules	of	 the	 fund5.	 In	 line	with	 the	sources	of	 their	 funds,	SWFs	
can	 be	 distinguished	 along	 their	 objectives.	Broad categorization based on 
the objectives of the fund would consider the following different objective 
categories: (i) reserve investment corporations that aim to enhance returns 
on reserves, (ii) pension-reserve funds, (iii) fiscal stabilization funds, (iv) 
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related	to	an	aging	population	with	the	latter	being	a	cause	of	future	economic	










concerned	with	 intergenerational	equity	and	 transfers.	 Intergenerational	equity	
focuses	on	benefiting	the	current	and	future	generations	as	equally	as	possible.	
This	may	be	done	by	setting	up	an	endowment	type	fund	that	converts	a	finite	
(extractive)	 asset	 with	 an	 infinite	 string	 of	 financial	 cash	 flows	 to	 benefit	 the	
present	and	all	 future	generations.	 In	 some	economies,	 saving	assets	abroad	




































subject	 to	 a	 given	 risk	 tolerance.	The	 expected	 additional	 return	 is	 a	 function	




remain	 implicit.	 The	 operationalization	 of	 the	 objectives	 of	 pension	 and	 other	
liability-focused	wealth	 funds	 follows	 the	 asset	 liability	management	 approach	
applied	by	the	pension	funds.	In	contrast	to	the	reserve	investment	corporations,	
the	horizon	over	which	the	liabilities	materialize	is	often	well	identified.	This	allows	
for	 the	explicit	maximization	of	 the	net	 value	of	 the	 funds	 (in	essence	 the	net	
present	value	of	the	investments	minus	expected	payments	for	the	liabilities)	over	





with	 further	 institutional	 arrangements.	 The	 experience	 to	 date	 suggests	 that	
governance	framework	in	the	respective	countries	provide	little	indications	as	to	
what	institutions	determine	the	SWF’s	policy	objectives	and	overall	risk	tolerance,	
its	 operational	 objectives,	 its	 investment	 guidelines	 and	who	will	 ultimately	 be	
the	 executor	 of	 the	 latter.	 This	 remains	 of	 particular	 interest	 especially	 when	
considering	 that	 the	 latter	determine	where	SWFs’	assets	are	 invested.	 In	any	
case,	the	investment	policy	should	be	consistent	with	the	broad	policy	objectives.	
While	the	operational	objectives	drive	the	investment	horizon,	the	risk	tolerance	
and	 the	 investment	environment	 (including	asset	classes	and	 their	correlation,	





2.2. The magnitude of the SWFs: An assessment
SWFs,	like	other	financial	institutions,	have	not	been	immune	to	the	effects	








At	the	end	of	2008	SWFs based on oil and gas revenues accounted for 2/3 
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established	 since	 2005.	 These	 SWFs	 appear	 to	 be	 investing	 their	 capital	 in	
private,	risky	assets	with	considerable	focus	on	the	financial	sector.      










Algeria	 Reserve	Fund 25 2000 Oil





Azerbaijan	 State	Oil	Fund 1.5 1999 Oil
Botswana	 Pula	Fund	 4.7 1993
Dia-
monds
Brunei	 Brunei	Investment	Agency	(BIA)	 35 1983 Oil





Chile	Pension	Reserves	Fund	 0.6 2007 Copper
China	 China	Investment	Company	Ltd. 200 2007 N.C
Central	Hujin	Investment	Corp.	 100 2003 N.C
East	Timor Timor-Leste	Petroleum	Fund 1.2 2005 Oil,	gas
7  N.C	stands	for	non-commodity	funds





















Kuwait	 Kuwait	Investment	Authority	(KIA)	 250 1953 Oil
Libya Reserve	Fund 50 2006 	Oil







New	Zealand	Superannuation	Fund	 10 2003 N.C

























Various	Funds	 300 various Oil





Temasek	Holdings	 108 1974 N.C
South	
Korea 




























Total	 assets	 under	 SWFs	 emerge	 as	 an	 impressive	 figure,	 representing	
a	multiple	 of	 the	 assets	 held	 a	 decade	ago;	 nevertheless,	 they	make	up	 less	
than	1/2	of	 global	 foreign	exchange	 reserves,	 less	 than	1/6	of	 global	 pension	
assets,	around	1/7	of	global	investment	SWFs	and	insurance	assets,	less	than	
1/10	of	global	stock	market	capitalization	and	only	3%	of	bank	assets	worldwide.	












financial	 crisis.	 Scenarios	 for	 the	 development	 of	 assets	 managed	 by	 SWFs	
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based	on	past	performance	of	 foreign	exchange	reserves		suggests	that	 in	10	
years,	total	assets	under	SWF	management	are	likely	to	amount	to	USD	7	tr	with	
the	 latter	 figure	 being	 two	 times	 larger	 than	 the	 current	 accumulated	 volume.	
Nevertheless,	the	underlying	SWF	growth	potential	is	contingent	upon	the	future	
of	globalization.	On the assumption that current account balances resume 
their recent trend of widening deficits in the US and strongly growing 




global	 macroeconomic	 risks	 such	 as	 exchange	 rate	 movements,	 commodity	
price	 changes,	 trade	movements,	 capital	 flows,	 global	 political	 risks,	 potential	
protectionism	in	recipient	countries,	and	the	political	climate	between	the	origin	
and	the	recipient	governments.	
SWFs	 have	 long	 investment	 horizons	 and	 generally	 have	 no	 commercial	
liabilities,	hence	in	periods	of	market	stress	they	are	likely	to	face	less	pressure	


















2.3. Commodity price fluctuations and the SWFs 
SWFs	 are	 related	 to	 two	 principal	 challenges	 in	 the	 accumulation	 of	
national	 wealth	 over	 time.	 First,	 natural	 resources	 are	 exhaustible;	 once	 they	
are	extracted	and	consumed	they	are	depleted.	Similarly,	superior	international	
competitiveness	 of	 domestic	 industries	 can	 be	 a	 transitory	 phenomenon	 that	






19                                                                                                                                  
above	into	consideration,	the	potential	advantages	of	delegating	national	wealth	
management	to	a	SWF	can	be	related	to	inter-temporal	stabilization	where	funds,	
especially	 stabilization	 funds,	 can	 help	 shield	 an	 economy	against	 volatility	 in	
markets	of	critical	 value	 for	an	economy,	such	as	oil	or	other	commodities.	 In	
this	case,	 the	SWFs	serve	as	a	 liquidity	pool	which	 is	 replenished	at	 times	of	
favorable	commodity	price	conditions	or	reserve	inflows,	and	which	can	be	drawn	
upon	in	cases	of	low	asset	prices	or	shortage	of	reserves.	
SWFs	 can	 be	 related	 to	 diversification	 outcomes.	 Oil	 or	 other	 commodity	




leads	 to	an	appreciation	of	 the	real	exchange	rate	and	 thereby	diminishes	 the	
competitiveness	of	other	sectors	in	the	economy	(also	addressed	as	the	“Dutch	
disease”	effect).	The	diversification	of	national	wealth	by	investing	internationally	
and	 in	 a	 greater	 range	 of	 assets	 can	 help	 reduce	 these	 concentration	 risks.	
Empirical assessment to date indicates that for resource-rich countries with 
resource funds, the establishment of the fund did not have an identifiable 
moderating impact upon government spending.	In	terms	of	causality,	countries	
with	more	prudent	expenditure	policies	tended	to	establish	resource	funds,	rather	
than	 the	 fund	presence	 itself	 leading	 to	 the	 increased	expenditure	 restraint.	 In	






allocation	 has	 been	 determined	 by	 political	 motives	 rather	 than	 economic	
outcomes	or	optimal	allocation	of	resources.	
3. SWFs:













































































Russia 2 2 4 8
11	 http://www.breakingviews.com/2008/01/04/Sovereign%20wealth%20SWFs%20index.
aspx?sg=breakingstories	




Brunei 4 2 2 8
9 Economic and 
Social	Stabili-
zation	Fund
Chile 4 2 2 8
10 Kuwait	Invest-
ment	Authority
Kuwait 3 2 2 7
11 National	Stabi-
lization	Fund
Taiwan 4 1 2 7
12 Istithmar UAE	
(Dubai)







2 3 1 6
14 Temasek Singa-
pore









Korea 2 2 2 6
17 Khazanah	
Nazional
Malaysia 2 1 2 5
18 Alaska	Perma-
nent	Fund




Canada 1 1 1 3
20 Government	
Pension	Fund
Norway 1 1 1 3
The	BV	index	suggests	some	surprising	points	to	consider.	China	Investment	
Corporation,	 the	 giant	 $200bln	 SWF	 that	 recently	 acquired	 stakes	 in	Morgan	
Stanley	and	Blackstone,	is	the	top	with	11	points.	But	only	two	other	SWFs	are	
placed	in	this	category:	the	Qatar	Investment	Authority	and	Venezuela’s	National	




Authority,	 the	 flagship	 SWF	 for	 a	 country	 recently	 hailed	 by	 former	 President	
Bush	as	a	beacon	for	 the	Middle	East.	That	 is	because	the	Russian	fund	only	













private	 equity	 firms	 and	 hedge	 funds,	 which	 also	 take	 controlling	 interests	 in	
companies	 and	 are	 often	 far	 from	 transparent.	 The	 index	 suggests	 that	 even	
high	 ranking	 SWFs	 should	 not	 be	 automatically	 penalized.	 They	 just	 require	
closer	scrutiny.	Deals	should	be	assessed	on	a	case-by-case	basis.	The	second	





An alternative index of transparency is the Linaburg-Maduell 
Transparency Index developed by the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. 
The	index	assesses	10	essential	principles	that	depict	SWF	transparency	to	the	














•	 Does	 the	 fund	 provide	 guidelines	 in	 reference	 to	 ethical	 standards,	
investment	policies,	and	enforcement	of	guidelines?
•	 Does	the	fund	provide	clear	strategies	and	objectives?





are	an	 indication	of	 the	willingness	of	 the	 respective	governments	 to	 disclose	
information	which	depend	on	(i)	 the	scale	of	 the	 fund,	(ii)	 the	 learning	and	the	
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harmonization	with	the	transparency	tools,	and	(iii)	the	cooperation	with	suitable	
regional	 and	 global	 organizations	 and	 initiatives	 like	 the	 Extractive	 Industries	
Transparency	Initiative	(EITI).	
Figure 3. Transparency scores for the SWFs of the Caspian basin 
countries
3.2. SWFs: Risk overview
Other	types	of	risk	to	be	considered	when	exploring	SWFs	are	related	to	the	
operational,	economic	and	political	environment,	to	the	investment	choices	and	
to	 the	existing	fiscal	and	 institutional	structures.	Starting	with	political	 risks	 the	
above	are	assessed	in	the	following	sections.
Political risk
The	 experiences	 strongly	 suggest	 that	 SWFs	 are	 likely	 to	 face	 political	
risks	 in	both	developed	and	developing	economies	due	 to	 the	 inherent	salient	
characteristic	of	the	funds,	i.e.	the	government	ownership.	However, the political 
risk in developing economies appears to be higher due to the uncertainties 
stemming from harder-to-anticipate regime changes and weaker regulatory 
frameworks. Nevertheless,	since	a	key	objective	of	the	fund	is	to	reap	returns	
higher	than	those	offered	by	fixed	income	investments	(which	generally	offer	low-
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expected	to	rise,	regardless	of	where	they	choose	to	invest12.
It	 is	 important	 to	 remember	 that	SWFs	are	partly	a	policy	 response	 to	 the	










General economic activity risks 
The risks that SWFs face in their investment operations can be 
classified into four broad categories: financial, operational, regulatory, and 
reputation risks.	The	main	financial	risks	are	market	risk	(interest	rate,	foreign	
currency,	equity	and	commodity	price	risks),	credit	risk	(issuer,	counterparty,	and	
settlement	 risks),	 and	 liquidity	 risk.	The	main	 operational	 risks	 include	 people	
risk	(incompetence	and	fraud),	business	continuity	risk,	process	risk,	technology	
risk,	 and	 legal	 risk.	The	main	 regulatory	 risk	 stems	 from	 changes	 in	 the	 laws	
and	regulations	governing	the	operation	of	SWFs	in	countries	of	origin	as	well	
as	 recipient	 countries,	 or	 from	 changes	 in	 the	 application	 of	 such	 laws	 and	
regulations.	 Reputation	 risk	 is	 the	 potential	 that	 negative	 publicity	 regarding	
a	 SWF’s	 business	 practices,	 whether	 true	 or	 untrue,	may	 cause	 a	 decline	 in	
investment	returns,	costly	litigation,	or	loss	of	counterparties,	or	impair	the	home	
country	government’s	 international	 standing.	The	 risk	management	 framework	
should	 include	reliable	 information	and	 timely	 reporting	systems,	which	should	
enable	 the	 adequate	 monitoring	 and	 management	 of	 relevant	 risks	 within	
acceptable	parameters	and	levels,	control	and	incentive	mechanisms,	codes	of	
conduct,	business	continuity	planning,	and	an	independent	audit	function.	
The	measurement	 and	management	 of	 financial	 risks	 is	 typically	 done	 by	
using	quantitative	methodologies	and	models.	To	complement	these	models	and	
to	mitigate	“model	risk,”	stress	tests	should	regularly	be	conducted	to	evaluate	
the	 potential	 effects	 of	 macroeconomic	 and	 financial	 variables	 or	 shocks.	 To	
assess,	manage,	or	mitigate	operational	 risks,	 there	should	be	an	established	
and	 documented	 framework	 that	 has	 clear	 lines	 of	 responsibility,	 segregation	
of	duties,	and	 reliable	control	mechanisms.	Codes	of	conduct	and	 recruitment	
policies	 are	 important	 to	 ensure	 the	 professional	 and	 ethical	 behavior	 of	 staff	
involved	in	the	fund’s	operations.	To	ensure	that	the	SWF	can	continue	operating	
in	the	case	of	a	technology	breakdown	or	natural	disaster,	contingency	planning,	
including	 alternative	 sites	 of	 operation,	 is	 an	 important	 part	 of	 the	 framework.	
In	mitigating	 regulatory	 and	 reputation	 risks,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 have	 adequate	
systems	 to	 track	 current	 regulatory	 and	 legal	 requirements	 in	 each	 recipient	
country	that	the	SWFs	invest	in.	To	satisfy	the	owner	and	the	governing	body	that	
12		Rajaratnam	(2008)




of	 the	 SWF.	 While	 broad	 principles	 are	 generally	 established	 within	 the	 law	






and	 the	 political	 climate	 between	 governments.	 In	 addition	 to	 tactical	 risk	






the	 types	of	 investment	 they	can	hold	 (investment	grade	assets	only),	and	on	
other	characteristics	of	their	portfolio.
For	several	SWFs	 the	operational	 risk	 is	controlled	 through	 the	separation	
of	responsibilities,	including	front,	middle,	and	back	offices.	SWFs	also	mitigate	










   
Investment risks and risk tolerance  
Risk	tolerance	refers	to	an	investor’s	willingness	and	ability	to	handle	declines	
in	the	value	of	 its	portfolio.	For	example,	 it	can	be	expressed	as	the	degree	of	
uncertainty	 that	 an	 investor	 can	 accept	 with	 regard	 to	 a	 negative	 change	 in	
the	value	of	 the	portfolio13	A	benchmark	portfolio	 is	a	 reference	portfolio	or	an	
index	constructed	on	the	basis	of	the	investment	policy.	It	serves	as	a	basis	for	
comparison	of	 the	performance	of	 the	actual	 portfolio.	Asset	 class	 refers	 to	 a	
group	 of	 securities	 that	 exhibit	 similar	 characteristics,	 and	 behave	 similarly	 in	
the	financial	market.	Examples	of	asset	classes	include	stocks,	bonds,	and	real	









Derivatives	are	useful	 in	SWFs’	operations	 -	 some	may	use	 them	only	 for	
hedging	purposes,	whereas	others	also	use	them	for	active	position	taking.	While 
SWFs typically do not use much leverage, this is often an integral part of an 
SWF’s investment, risk management, and cash management frameworks. 
It	may	show	up	 in	a	variety	of	 forms,	 including	 traditional	borrowing	to	finance	
investments,	 use	 of	 futures	 and	 options	 contracts,	 interest	 rate	 and	 currency	
swaps,	repos,	and	buy/sell-back	operations.	In	addition,	leverage	is	an	integral	
part	of	 investing	in	certain	asset	classes	such	as	“alternative	investments”	and	









its	 risks	 to	protect	 its	assets	and	stay	within	 the	 tolerance	 levels	as	set	 in	 the	
investment	policy.	Adherence	to	high	standards	in	risk	management	with	sound	
operational	 controls	 and	 systems	will	 also	help	 achieve	 the	aim	of	 preserving	
international	 financial	 stability	 as	 well	 as	 maintaining	 a	 stable,	 transparent,	
and	 open	 investment	 environment.	 The	 general	 approach	 to	 the	 SWF’s	 risk	
management	 framework	should	be	publicly	disclosed.	Public	disclosure	of	 the	
SWF’s	general	approach	to	its	risk	management	policies	and	key	actions	related	
to	 governance	 and	 the	 soundness	 of	 its	 operations	 reassures	 that	 the	 fund,	
its	 governing	 body,	 or	management	 adheres	 to	 a	 high	 standard	 of	managing	
operational,	regulatory	and	reputation	risks.	
The	investment	policy	guides	the	SWF	in	implementing	activities	consistent	
with	 the	approved	 investment	objectives	and	strategies,	and	risk	 tolerance,	as	
well	as	 its	 investment	monitoring	procedures.	Although	 there	 is	no	set	 formula	
that	 suits	 all	 situations,	 the	 investment	 policy,	 including	 the	 strategic	 asset	
allocation,	should	draw	upon	appropriate	portfolio	management	principles.	The	
strategic	 asset	 allocation	 is	 typically	 embodied	 in	 a	 benchmark	 portfolio	 and	
determined	 by	 the	 SWF’s	 policy	 purpose,	 liability	 profile,	 horizon	 over	 which	





for	 example,	 exclusively	 investing	 in	 foreign	 assets.	 In	 addition,	 the	 strategic	
asset	allocation	may	consider	the	SWF’s	investments	in	conjunction	with	other	
assets	or	 liabilities	of	 the	country,	resulting	 in,	 for	example,	 investing	 in	assets	
negatively	 correlated	 with	 the	 country’s	 natural	 resources.	As	 the	 parameters	
and	assumptions	underlying	the	SWF’s	investment	policy	–	including	its	strategic	
asset	allocation	–	change	over	time,	a	periodic	review	is	needed	(as	it	is	currently	
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done	by	funds	in	Australia,	New	Zealand	and	Singapore).
The	risk	 tolerance	 is	a	key	constraint	on	 the	maximization	of	 the	expected	
return	over	the	investment	horizon.	The	risk	constraint	is	based	on	the	ultimate	
stakeholders’	 willingness	 and	 ability	 to	 take	 risk.	 Ideally,	 the	 risk	 preference	
focuses	on	the	entire	investment	horizon,	and	can	take	the	form	of	a	maximum	
acceptable	 deviation	 at	 the	 points	 of	withdrawals	 and	 the	 risk/return	 tradeoffs	
at	 these	points.	 In	other	words,	 there	 is	 less	of	a	need	to	be	concerned	about	
daily	volatility	if	the	investment	horizon	is	a	year.	For	example,	the	value	of	the	
investment	can	increase	and	decrease	daily	by	ten	percent	but	the	key	aspect	
is	 the	 value	 in	 a	 year’s	 time	 when	 the	 withdrawal	 takes	 place.	 However,	 in	
practice,	investors	may	have	some	concerns	about	short-term	volatility.	A	typical	






regard,	 an	 early	 start	with	 investing	 resources	 to	 build	 up	 a	 buffer,	 having	 an	
oversight	body	with	experienced	and	respected	professionals,	and	educating	lay	
stakeholders	can	help	limit	the	cost	imposed	by	this	additional	constraint14.
Cross-border investments and the risk of protectionism
The	biggest	external	risk	faced	by	new	SWFs	is	that	of	financial	protectionism,	
especially	 from	 industrialized	 countries.	 The cross-border investments of 
SWFs not only affect the legitimate interests of home countries but also 







of	 financial	 protectionism	 in	 host	 countries.	 Financial	 protectionism	 constrains	
how	and	where	the	new	SWFs	can	invest	and	thus	imposes	a	significant	cost.




issue	 settled	 only	 when,	 in	 March	 2006,	 Dubai	 Ports	 World	 agreed	 to	 hand	
over	operation	of	those	ports	to	the	U.S.	entities.	Similar	concerns	were	raised	
both	in	New	Zealand	and	Sweden	following	Dubai's	offers	to	buy	the	Auckland	
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amount	of	equity	in	NASDAQ	itself.	On	September	20,	2007,	President	George	
W.	 Bush	 stated	 in	 a	 news	 conference	 about	 the	 then-pending	 acquisition	 of	
NASDAQ	 that	 an	 investment	 by	 a	 government-owned	 company	 in	 NASDAQ	
would	be	subject	to	review	by	national	security	agencies,	although	he	provided	a	
provisional	welcome	of	the	deal15.
Fiscal and institutional risks
The	 prospect	 of	 government	 support	 for	SWFs	may	 encourage	 excessive	
risk-taking.	 The	 flip	 side	 of	 this	 argument	 is	 that	 using	 SWFs	 to	 support	 the	






short	notice	will	bring	about	major	losses	for	the	SWF.	More generally, serious 
financial risks for SWFs will ensue if the government views their assets as 
free fiscal resources to be used ad hoc so as to meet various fiscal needs. 
The	vast	majority	of	reserves	are	not	fiscal	reserves	but	Central	Bank	reserves	
with	 counterpart	 liabilities.	The	 balance	 sheet	 of	 even	 the	 best-run	SWFs	will	
suffer	if	the	government	views	SWF	assets	as	fiscal	assets	to	be	used	freely	at	
its	own	discretion.
Overall,	 new	 SWFs	 simply	 do	 not	 yet	 have	 the	 institutional	 capacity	 to	
effectively	manage	a	 portfolio	 of	 high-risk,	 high-return	 investments.	SWFs	are	
financially	 sophisticated	 investors	 with	 large	 investments	 in	 alternative	 asset	
classes	such	as	private	equity,	venture	capital,	and	real	estate.	Furthermore,	they	
are	often	active	investors	seeking	to	control	or	at	least	influence	the	management	
of	companies.	 It	 is	not	only	unrealistic	but	also	downright	dangerous	 for	some	
countries	to	believe	that	it	is	possible	to	build	capacity	overnight.	In	the	absence	
of	 adequate	 investment	 management	 capacity,	 including	 risk	 management	
capacity,	 pursuing	 investment	 strategies	 creates	 dangerously	 high	 levels	 of	
risk.	Nevertheless,	popular	pressures	for	profits	may	encourage	SWFs	to	try	to	
run	before	 they	can	walk,	 to	pursue	high-risk,	high-return	 investments	without	
adequate	capacity	to	handle	risk.	Succumbing	to	such	pressures	entails	a	clear	
risk	of	large,	even	catastrophic,	investment	losses.	In	addition,	the	participation	
of	a	 foreign	SWF	 in	a	financial	 institution	 (credit	 institution)	may	endanger	 the	
effective	 supervision	 of	 this	 institution.	 Financial	 supervisors	 could	 experience	
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3.3. SWFs and the macroeconomic implications 
   
Where	the	SWF’s	activities	have	significant	direct	domestic	macroeconomic	
implications,	 those	 activities	 should	 be	 closely	 coordinated	 with	 the	 domestic	
fiscal	 and	monetary	 authorities,	 so	 as	 to	 ensure	 consistency	 with	 the	 overall	
macroeconomic	 policies.	 Since	 SWFs	 are	 often	 created	 for	 macroeconomic	
purposes,	 their	 operations	 should	 support	 and	 be	 consistent	 with	 a	 sound	
overall	macroeconomic	policy	 framework.	The SWF’s operations can have a 
significant impact on public finances, monetary conditions, the balance 
of payments, and the overall sovereign balance sheet.	Thus,	operations	of	
the	SWF	that	have	significant	macroeconomic	implications	should	be	executed	







focus	of	 these	funds	 is	 to	maintain	economic	stability	against	commodity	price	
fluctuations	and	to	ensure	that	future	generations	will	not	be	disadvantaged	by	
the	exploitation	of	natural	resources	by	the	current	generation.	The	second	group	





related	 to	 capital	 inflows.	The	 last	 group	of	 funds,	which	accounts	 for	 a	more	
marginal	fraction	of	total	sovereign	wealth,	contains	the	pension	reserve	funds	for	
countries	such	as	New	Zealand,	France	or	Ireland,	which	have	set	aside	a	portion	
















are	 the	equivalent	 for	 sovereign	wealth	 funds	of	 the	 liability-driven	 investment	










asset	 allocation	 decisions.	 SWFs	without	 identified	 liabilities	 allow	 for	 a	more	
exclusive	focus	on	a	return	objective	and	acceptable	level	of	risk.	However,	for	
some	SWFs,	sterilization	instruments	used	to	mop	up	excess	liquidity	may	need	
to	be	considered	as	 liabilities,	especially	 from	an	 integrated	asset	and	 liability	
management	perspective.	The	objectives	of	SWFs	could	be	undermined	by	the	





macroeconomic	 implications,	 especially	 for	 developing	 and	 emerging	 market	
economies.	To invest domestically, SWFs would typically need to convert 
part of their accumulated assets back into domestic currency, possibly 
reversing the economic policies that led to reserve accumulation.	Investing	
domestically	could	stimulate	domestic	demand	with	 inflationary	consequences.	
Issues	of	 fiscal	 accounting,	 transparency,	 and	 risk	 could	also	emerge	 if	 those	
investments	 are	 actually	 government	 spending	 operations	 that	 should	 take	
place	within	the	budget.	Therefore,	domestic	investments	are	generally	seen	to	
be	 ruled	out	 in	SWFs.	Different	 types	of	SWFs	could	 have	markedly	 different	
strategic	asset	allocations	reflective	of	their	different	objectives	and	constraints.	









funds	 and	 pension	 reserve	 funds	 also	 aim	 to	 preserve	 a	minimum	amount	 of	
capital,	 in	 real	 terms,	so	 that	 the	purchasing	power	of	 the	 fund	 is	guaranteed.	
Pension	 reserve	 funds	 with	 explicit	 liabilities	 typically	 design	 strategic	 asset	
allocation	benchmarks	that	preserve	their	solvency.
17		http://www.edhec-risk.com/edito/RISKArticleEdito.2009-02-24.4440
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Despite	these	benefits,	many	governments	in	the	West	are	concerned	about	
investments	 by	 SWFs.	 The	 concerns	 are	 based	 on	 three	 domains:	 national	
security,	 corporate	 governance,	 and	 financial	 stability.	 The	 worries	 that	 are	




because	 the	government	may	draw	benefits	 from	 its	participation	 in	ways	 that	
















Turning	 to	supportive	arguments	 in	 favor	of	 the	SWFs,	 recent	 investments	
in	 developed	 financial	 institutions	 are	 not	 financial	 resources	 buried	 in	
the	 Persian	 Gulf	 and	 discovered	 by	 the	 leaders	 of	 those	 institutions.	 The	
assets	 of	 the	 SWFs	 already	 are	 invested	 abroad	 -	 by	 definition.	A	 significant	
proportion	 already	 is	 in	 US	 dollars	 probably	 in	 the	 United	 States.	 Thus,	
when	 SWFs	 invest	 in	 a	 US	 financial	 institution,	 only	 the	 form	 of	 its	 US	
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or	other	currencies.	A	creditor	government	could	halt	its	intervention	and	sell	its	
existing	stocks	of	dollars	and	dollar-denominated	financial	assets,	 the	“nuclear	
option.”	 If	 it	 held	 a	 large	 equity	 portfolio,	 this	 could	 include	 large	 stock	 sales 
19.













of	 important	 information	 could	 harm	 the	 state	 interests.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 better	
to	 be	 reassured	 and	 preclude	 all	 possibilities	 of	 promulgation	 of	 information	
regarding	 questions	 of	 how	 and	 where	 the	 SWF’s	 resources	 are	 managed.	
Actually, amid the existent 56 similar SWFs, as we can see from practice, 
the best performing ones are those which truly have real public control and 











1. The state establishes and manages the SWF on behalf of the society 
and it is accountable to the society.	Therefore,	mentioning	some	separate	and	
out-of-public-control	policy	of	the	SWFs	contradicts	the	generally	known	canons	
of	state	building.	That	is	particularly	the	case	if	the	matter	regards	the	democratic	











the	 funds’	 policy.	 Thus,	 the	 conventionality	 of	Azerbaijan	 implies	 that	 the	 civil	
sector	 successfully	 engaged	 in	 the	 EITI	 can	 effectively	 exert	 control	 over	 the	
fund.						
2. An SWF administers colossal resources, which occasionally exceed 
the capacity of the state budget, thus mistakes could cost too much.	In	the	
overwhelming	majority	of	cases,	total	assets	of	the	SWFs	exceed	the	budgets	of	
the	countries	 they	represent.	Stepwise	examination,	discussion	and	eventually	









the	 government	 and	 the	 legislators	 is	 reached	 in	 Parliament.	 The	 practice	 of	
SWFs’	future	budget	discussions	in	the	Parliament	in	the	context	of	consolidated	
budgets	 certainly	 smoothes	away	 these	defects.	However,	 this	 practice	 is	 not	
the	case	in	all	countries,	and	most	importantly,	it	covers	only	the	fund	resource	
spending	 in	 the	framework	of	 the	assets’	budget	 for	 the	next	year.	Meanwhile,	
SWF	assets	and	their	management	in	the	vast	majority	of	cases	remain	out	of	
discussions	and	effective	control	of	the	legislators.	
3. Assets of the SWFs are generated not by atomized taxpayers, but 


















but	not	demonstrating	an	adequate	 trend.	Professional	public	 control	 and	 full-
fledged	information	access	could	minimize	such	deformations	and	serve	as	the	
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missing	critical	 indicator,	which	 in	 the	case	of	a	state	budget	would	display	 its	
deficit	performance.			
4. The vast majority of the SWFs pertain to the countries of risk, which 











responsibility	 of	 the	 subject	 instances	 before	 others,	 with	 merely	 an	 external	
impact.	 As	 a	 result,	 we	 can	 observe	 periodically	 recurring	 recommendations	
of	 international	 agencies,	 although	 implementation	 of	 these	 recommendations	
leaves	much	to	be	desired.	One	should	accept	the	fact	that	for	the	independent	






5. Traditions of strong non-governmental movements in the 
vast majority of those states which have similar SWFs are not 
developed and are even alien to the public mentality.	 30	 out	 of	 56	SWFs	
belong	 to	 countries	 with	 poorly	 developed	 traditions	 of	 civil	 movements 
20.	In	some	countries	such	movements	do	not	exist	at	all.	In	such	conditions,	it	is	
extremely	difficult	to	set	up	public	control	embodied	by	civil	organizations.	However,	













capacity	growth	 this	 is	 far	 from	 the	 local	objective)	 can	 later	 focus	entirely	on	
other	important	state	objectives.	A	typical	example	of	that	could	be	the	civil	sector	
focused	on	 the	oil	and	gas	field	of	Azerbaijan.	Established in 2004, the EITI 
20		http://www.swfinstitute.org/research/transparencyindex.php
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coalition has evolved from year to year and is capable enough today to set 
some greater global tasks.	The	capacity	building	that	was	realized	significantly	
















NGOs at this point are entrusted with a special mission. NGOs alongside 
the media are the structure most interested in securing the transparency of 
the SWFs.	Apart	 from	this	keen	 interest,	non-governmental	organizations	also	
have	the	greatest	capacity	in	this	activity.	This	capacity	was	accumulated	within	





that	 none	 of	 the	 previously	mentioned	 instruments	 are	 applicable	 to	 our	 end.	























about	SWFs’	activity	and	 their	growing	capacities.	Unfortunately, in the vast 
majority of cases, it is mostly a question of international level and world-
renowned print agencies and electronic means that rarely get to have 
materials about SWFs in countries of risk.	Meanwhile,	herein	one	may	feel	












Activities of the SWFs, just like the activities of any other financial 
structure, are multidimensional and in their content, they require not only 
regular press coverage but also thorough elaboration. This	 is	beyond	 the	
power	 of	 a	 regular	 observer.	 It	 requires	 special	 qualifications.	 For	 instance,	
the	 fact	 of	 how	 well	 information	 access	 is	 arranged	 and	 how	 regularly	 and	
comprehensively	it	is	disclosed	is	a	basis	to	judge	the	transparency	of	the	SWFs;	
however,	 this	 information	 is	 insufficient	 to	 judge	 its	 efficiency.	 Even	 regularly	
updated	information	on	profitability	level	is	not	yet	sufficient,	as	any	rate	of	the	




are	 subject	 for	 engagement.	 Therefore,	 independent	 and	 simultaneously	
professional	study	 focused	on	 the	appraisal	of	 the	SWFs	and	 their	successful	




    
SWFs	are	always	a	sensitive	object	for	politicians,	populists	and	other	layers	
of	society,	which	is	understandable.	The	ultimate	mission	of	the	vast	majority	of	
SWFs	 is	 the	accumulation	of	 assets	 received	 from	 the	sale	of	 non-renewable	
resources	 for	 the	 next	 generations	 as	well.	That	makes	 this	 structure	 socially	
sensitive	 and	 politically	 vulnerable.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 in	 the	
majority	 of	 the	 resource	 rich	 countries,	 such	 SWFs	 are	 the	 subject	 of	 sharp	
criticism	from	the	political	opponents.	Political parties, as a rule, criticize the 
authorities for ineffective management of the SWFs’ assets and urge the 
government to have better consideration of the interests of all the layers 
of society.	The	populists	propose	to	distribute	part	of	the	assets	among	citizens,	
allegedly	 for	 the	 fair	 consideration	 of	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 entire	 population.	








being	a	good	advantage	in	the	hand	of	a	government,	 it	 turns	against	 them.	It	
is	 not	 a	 wonder	 that	 political	 activity	 in	 the	 respective	 countries	 leaves	much	
to	be	desired,	while	opposition	is	extremely	weak	to	gain	in	the	majority	of	the	
examined	countries.






a) Clarity of goals, roles and responsibilities
This	generally-known	principle	in	the	case	of	the	SWFs	has	a	special	semantic	




in	the	country.	The risk of the SWF remaining an alien element in the state 
organism is high. In this case, as practice shows, this gap is not that 
much a matter of concern of preservation of assets for future generations. 
Meanwhile, a policy of stabilization and promotion of macroeconomic 
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place	of	 the	SWF	and	hence	determine	 the	adequate	mechanism	of	 decision	
making	in	the	management	of	the	SWF.
b) Sustainable development for the benefit of future generations
			 Resource-rich	 countries	 suffer	 most	 of	 all	 from	 the	 volatility	 of	 the	
market,	 hence	 they	 have	 continuous	 problems	 stemming	 from	 the	 lack	 of	
stable	economic	growth.	Provision	of	the	long-term	stability	herein	is	the	priority	
task	 of	 the	 government.	 Exhaustibility	 of	 resources	 aggravates	 the	 execution	
of	 this	 task.	For this very reason, the countries extracting for more than 
one decade show preference to the establishment of SWFs for future 
generations. Thus,	 the	mission	of	 the	SWFs	directly	aims	at	 the	provision	of	
long-term	stability,	which	is	further	ensured	by	the	effective	management	of	the	
SWF	assets.	 It	 is	worth	noting	that	 in	a	number	of	countries,	whilst	separating	
the	 two	 functions	 of	 the	SWF	 (stabilizing	 and	 accumulative),	 authorities	 show	
preference	to	the	establishment	of	two	separate	SWFs	(e.g.	Russia,	Alaska,	etc).	
In	other	examples,	like	the	case	of	Azerbaijan,	the	government	prefers	to	combine	











comprehensive	 and	 understandable	 information.	 It is important to have 
an opportunity to compare the potential and efficiency of SWF activity 
with analogical SWFs in other countries based on available information 
and within its boundaries and its own dynamics.	 Once	 the	 determinants	
of	 good	 governance	 are	 clarified	 it	 remains	 interesting	 to	 examine	 how	 these	
principles	of	good	governance	can	be	ensured.	All	 things	equal,	 the	better	 the	
SWF	is	administered	the	more	successfully	it	will	develop.	Poor	management	is	
associated	with	poor	outcome.	An	SWF,	even	if	it	is	an	independent	legal	entity,	
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does	not	operate	in	a	vacuum	and	bears	the	marks	of	the	public	administration	








ranking.	The	 level	 of	 SOFAZ’s	 success	 leaves	 behind	 the	 national	 indicators.	
Besides,	the	principal	distinction	of	the	SWFs	from	other	public	financial	structures	










accountability	 (audit)	 on	 foreign	markets;	 hence,	 these	 structures	 are	 treated	
with	 special	 requirements.	Eventually,	 the	 savings	 function	 of	 the	SWFs	adds	
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1. Government
Government	has	the	principal	responsibility	for	the	successful	management	
of	the	SWF.	The government, usually represented by the Ministry of Finance, 
is the owner of the SWF.	In	the	majority	of	countries,	the	administration	of	the	
SWF	is	performed	by	the	highest	political	ranks	of	the	state	by	the	appointment	
of	 the	 specific	 head	 of	 this	 structure.	 The	 government	 is	 interested	 in	 the	
optimal	 incorporation	 of	 the	 SWF	 to	 the	 overall	 macroeconomic	 architecture	
of	the	country.	It	 is	further	interested	in	the	resolution	of	many	current	financial	
problems	related	to	the	SWF.	Thus,	in	a	period	of	difficulties	such	as	those	of	the	




of	 the	SWF	 in	 practice	might	 not	 bring	 anything	 positive.	Higher	 inflation	 and	
macroeconomic	imbalance	becomes	the	outcome	of	such	a	policy,	which	in	the	
end	results	 in	a	loss	of	the	competitive	advantage	for	the	country.	Considering	
that	 the	 terms	of	 the	government’s	power	are	discrete	and	 limited	 in	 time,	 the	
government	 tends	 to	 spend	 the	 assets	 of	 the	 SWF	 for	 smoothing	 purposes	
and	 economic	 development	 over	 time,	 handing	 a	 legacy	 of	 debts	 and	 poor	
economy	to	the	new	authority.	In	the	countries	with	poor	institutions,	this	risk	of	
uncontrolled	use	of	assets	(as	long	as	the	government	may	easily	trample	down	







a	strong	parliament.	Parliament as the legislative body is able not only to 
ensure the necessary long-term supervision over the spending of SWF 
assets but also to restrain the appetite of the government by putting up 
a legislative screen against the unrestrained spending of the assets. 
The	experience	shows	that	successful	SWFs	are	generally	accountable	 to	 the	








(and	 it	 already	 has)	 lead	 to	 serious	 violation	 of	 macroeconomic	 proportions	
which	results	in	financial	imbalances	and	unusually	high	rates	of	inflation	for	the	
respective	countries.
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3. Chamber of Accounts






Thus,	SOFAZ	 falls	 under	 the	 full	 control	 of	 the	Chamber.	As is stipulated in 
the aforesaid law, the Chamber exercises control over the volume of the 
receipts and the expenditure assets of the state budget and out-of-budget 
SWFs, control over their structure and timely execution in line with their 
assignment. 
4. International financial institutions 
Amid	all	 international	 financial	 institutions	 (IFI),	 the	most	 actively	engaged	
in	the	process	of	promotion	of	the	successful	management	of	the	SWFs	is	the	
International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF).	IMF in the context of the country reviews 
and regularly develops recommendations on the improvement of the 
SWF management and expresses special interest in the identification of 









of	 the	 23	 significant	 SWFs	 around	 the	 world.	 Inauguration	 of	 the	 Forum	 of	
the	SWFs	 in	October	 in	Baku	can	also	be	considered	an	 important	milestone	
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Conclusion
The present brief has reviewed SWFs and their emergence as key players in 
the global financial arena. The latter has stimulated a fresh look at the nature, the 
operations, the risks and the governance patterns that SWFs experience. Initial 
assessment of the current developments indicates that under the ongoing global 
financial developments, SWFs are seen to represent a permanent redirection 
in investment flows and a shift in the dominant sources of financial capital. To 
date, global financial operations were dominated by Anglo-American financial 
institutions, but recent developments suggest increasing capital flows from 
emerging to mature economies. In these flows SWFs imply a redistribution of 
financial and political capital. Considering this reality, the presence of a blurring 
line between finance and politics raises concerns that SWFs will be used 
illegitimately to advance political, as opposed to commercial, agendas. 
The conceptualization and the understanding of the latter lie with the thorough 
clarification of the nature and the operation of the respective SWFs as they seem to 
differ widely in purpose, maturity, risk attitude and investment preferences. In the 
present analysis these differences have been identified and analyzed indicating 
where the peculiarities and the dangers may lie. In particular the experiences to 
date suggest that SWFs are likely to face political risks in both developed and 
developing economies due to the inherent salient characteristic of the SWFs of 
government ownership. These political risks appear to be higher in developing 
economies due to the uncertainties stemming from harder-to-anticipated regime 
changes and weaker regulatory frameworks. When considering the financial 
risks, these are related to the fact that the respective governments might view 
SWF assets as free fiscal resources to be used ad hoc. Overall assessment of the 
SWFs and their changing role in the global financial arena indicates that the quality 
of the governance patterns of the SWFs and the relationship of the latter with the 
domestic and international economic and institutional structure remain of primary 
importance. In this context the present attempt has offered some crystallized 
characteristics of good governance looking at transparency, accountability and 
public awareness. In this direction of governance strengthening and overall 
improvements the respective governments, parliaments, civil society groups and 
international financial organizations emerge as players of key importance. 
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Recommendations
1. Stakeholders should take into account that the political risk related to SWF 
activities in developing economies appears to be higher due to the uncertainties 
stemming from harder-to-anticipate regime changes and weaker regulatory 
frameworks.
2. In order to assess, manage, or mitigate overall risks, there should be a 
prescribed and documented framework that has clear lines of responsibility, 
segregation of duties, and reliable control mechanisms in SWFs.
3. SWFs’ financial supervisors could experience difficulties when they attempt 
the exercise of their supervisory function, to determine whether the participation of 
the SWF in a financial institution jeopardizes the ‘sound and prudent management’ 
of the credit organization.
4. Funds’ top managements have to evade serious fiscal risks for SWFs 
which will ensue if the government views their assets as free resources to be 
used ad hoc to cover various fiscal needs.
5. In order to ensure predictability of the SWF, its necessary for government, 
as owner of the fund, to focus on public disclosure and public control issues. This 
work should be more comprehensive and for this, governments have to provide 
to IWG the relevant program for further improvements.  
6. Local CSO have to work out the program of cooperation with SWF in the 
resource rich countries and for this they can cooperate with international NGO’s. 
The main line of this program should be “how to achieve good results of the public 
disclosure policy of the SWF in the country.”
7. International financial institutions, particularly the IMF, should develop 
the indicative assessment mechanism of the SWFs in order to improve good 
governance practice, and after that they must popularize this practice in the world.
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Governance, transparency and accountability in 
Sovereign Wealth Funds: remarks on the assessment, 









funds	operating	 in	 private	 financial	markets.	SWFs	are	 commonly	 established	
out	 of	 receipts	 resulting	 from	 commodity	 exports,	 out	 of	 balance	 of	 payments	
surpluses,	 official	 foreign	 currency	 operations,	 the	 proceeds	 of	 privatizations	
and/or	 fiscal	 surpluses.	 Recent	 interest	 in	 the	 SWFs	 has	 failed	 to	 come	 to	 a	
consensus	as	to	how	SWFs	differ	from	other	public	investment	funds	and	how	
they	 should	 be	 defined.	 Indeed	 SWFs	 differ	 in	 ownership,	 underlying	 assets,	
degree	of	dependence,	operational	aspects,	etc.	Of	the	existing	SWFs,	almost	
half	 operate	 as	 separate	 legal	 entities,	 while	 the	 rest	 consist	 of	 a	 dependent	
entity	within	the	Ministry	of	Finance	or	the	Central	Bank	of	the	relevant	country1.	
SWFs	 themselves	 declare	 various	 objectives	 ranging	 from	 fiscal	 stabilization	










that	governments,	at	 central	or	at	 sub-national	 level,	may	own	 the	SWFs	and	
exercise	control	directly	or	indirectly	upon	them.	In	this	case,	SWFs	can	be	seen	
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one	branch	of	the	government	owing	money	to	another	branch	of	the	government	
(i.e.	the	fund	may	owe	to	the	Ministry	of	Finance,	the	Central	Bank	or	the	social	







Following	 immense	 accumulation	 of	 international	 assets,	 policymakers	 in	
countries	with	SWFs	have	set	up	a	number	of	considered	as	“optimal”	operational	
and	 policy	 objectives.	 These	 “optimal”	 objectives	 vary	 between	 the	 existing	
funds.	The	differentials	among	the	SWFs,	which	reflect	these	different	policy	and	
operational	objectives,	the	increasing	number	of	the	SWFs	and	the	accumulating	
assets	held	and	managed	by	 the	SWFs,	have	 triggered	 interest	 in	SWFs	and	
in	 the	establishment	of	a	set	of	common	assessment	criteria	and	benchmarks	
for	SWFs.	 Indicative	are	 the	Truman	(2008)	scoreboard,	 the	Linaburg-Maduell	
Transparency	 Index	 developed	 by	 the	 Sovereign	 Wealth	 Fund	 Institute,	 or	
the	 guidelines	 for	SWFs	developed	 by	 the	 IMF	and	 the	OECD.	The	 attempts	












the	 developed	 assessment	 and	 ranking	 attempts	 of	 the	 SWFs	 have	 primarily	
reflected	 the	concerns	 that	 the	 international	financial	 institutions	and	 individual	
recipient	countries	of	SWFs’	investments	have	been	faced	with.	
These	concerns	have	primarily	 regarded	 the	governance	structures	of	 the	
SWFs	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 on	 funds’	 operations.	
Concerns	have	been	exacerbated	by	the	fact	that	the	wide	majority	of	the	SWFs	
are	based	in	undemocratic	countries.	This	has	raised	further	questions	on	whether	
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The	 recorded	 efforts	 come	 in	 large	 part	 from	 Western	 countries	 and	

















accountability	 benchmarks	 and	 ranking	 attempts.	 The	 analysis	 summarized	
discusses	the	main	limitations	in	these	attempts	indicating	their	impact	upon	the	















of	Alaska	or	Norway	 is	usually	employed	 in	support	of	 this	argument	(Fasano,	
2000;	 Birdsall	 and	 Subramania,	 2004).	 To	 date,	 indeed,	 there	 are	 not	 many	
examples	of	success.	The	Alaskan	and	Norwegian	funds	are	striking	exceptions.	
Nevertheless,	in	these	cases,	given	the	broader	national	policy	frameworks	
and	 the	 wide	 support	 for	 deferring	 some	wealth	 gains	 for	 future	 generations,	
further	 questions	 have	 regarded	 whether	 separate	 funds	 were	 needed	 in	
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exceeds	the	successful	cases	(Davis	et	al,	2003;	Davis	et	al,	2003;	Delvin	and	
Lewin,	2002).	With	the	exception	of	Norway,	with	its	strong	government	institutions	









Fund	 or	 the	 Nigerian	 Petroleum	 Trust	 Fund	 has	 indicated	 an	 even	 more	
complicated	problem:	the	quest	for	rigorous	governance,	adequate	transparency	
and	 accountability.	 Governance	 regards	 the	 role	 of	 the	 government,	 of	 the	
governing	 bodies	 and	 of	 the	 managers	 of	 the	 SWFs	 in	 the	 decision-making	
process	 regarding	 the	 flows	 into	 and	 out	 of	 the	 funds,	 the	 investments	made	







that	 weak	 governance	 along	 poor	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 make	 the	
funds	and	the	respective	countries	less	likely	to	convert	social	expenditures	into	
improved	 income	(Tsalik,	2003).	 In	many	countries	SWFs	are	set	up	 following	
increasing	surpluses	from	exports	of	natural	resources.	The	literature	on	resource-
rich	 economies	 supports	 the	 view	 that	 natural	 wealth	 can	 pose	 problems	 for	
economic	management4.	 In	a	 range	of	cases,	economic	performance	appears	
to	 suffer	 rather	 than	 benefit	 from	 the	 impact	 of	 natural	 resource	 endowments	
(Paldam,	1997;	Gylfason	and	Zoega,	2003).	The	 international	 community	and	
major	 international	 financial	 organizations	 have	 become	 growingly	 concerned	
about	 the	 effectiveness	 with	 which	 natural	 resource	 revenues	 are	 used.	 In	
particular	 they	 are	 concerned	 with	 the	 question	 of	 how	 funds	 can	 contribute	
towards	long-term	economic	and	social	development.	
The	 latter	 is	 a	 subject	 of	 the	 political	 economy	of	 resource-driven	 growth.	
Nevertheless,	 in	 the	 investigation	 of	 this	 relationship,	 it	 is	 also	 acknowledged	
the	crucial	dependency	of	the	fund	establishment	and	operational	outcomes	to	
implemented	 policies,	 in	 particular	 with	 regards	 to	 governance,	 transparency	














possibly	 resulting	 from	 the	 involvement	 of	 international	 financial	 organizations	
such	as	 the	 IMF	(Kalyuzhnova,	2006).	Nevertheless,	 the	key	 requirements	 for	
success	with	such	funds	appear	to	ultimately	lie	with	governance,	transparency	
and	 accountability	 standards.	 Governance,	 transparency	 and	 accountability	
aspects	 and	 their	 differentials	 depend	 in	 large	 part	 on	 the	 role	 that	 SWFs	
serve	(i.e.	accumulating	funds	so	as	to	stabilize	the	economy,	saving	funds	for	
future	 generations,	 addressing	 future	 payment	 obligations,	 etc)5.	Governance, 
transparency	 and	 accountability	 aspects	 that	 reflect	 political	 economy	 factors	
related	 to	 SWFs,	 such	 as	 institutions	 and	 the	 organizational	 design,	 remain	
important	for	several	reasons.	
A	 first	 area	 where	 governance,	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 remain	
important	 is	 the	 microeconomic	 domain.	 This	 regards	 in	 particular	 the	 rising	
concerns	about	rent-seeking	and	corruption.	These	problems	can	be	worsened	
by	 the	 lack	 of	 strong	 governance	 and	 sound	 provision	 of	 transparency	 and	
accountability.	The	principles	where	 clarity	 remains	 of	 primary	 importance	 are	
the	rules	that	ultimately	govern	who	will	benefit	from	redistribution	of	the	nation’s	
wealth	 and	 how	 far	 governmental	 policies	 act	 as	 disguised	 transfers	 in	 this	
regard	(Tullock,	1997).	For	resource-based	SWFs,	 the	role	of	 the	commitment	
mechanisms	 is	 further	 important	 in	 order	 to	 limit	 the	 possibility	 of	 dynamic	
inconsistency	 (Dixit,	 1996)	 or	 of	 conflicting	 interests.	 Overcoming	 distorted	
incentives	 in	 government	 intervention	 could	 be	 perceived	 as	 a	 challenge	 in	
achieving	an	optimal	 path	of	 the	public	welfare	 from	 resources	 (Kalyuzhnova,	
2006).	A	special	reference	should	be	made	at	this	point	to	rent-seeking	behavior	
of	corrupt	governments,	namely	 to	 the	aggregate	resources	absorbed	by	rent-
seeking.	 In	 the	case	of	 resource-rich	countries	 these	rents	can	be	quite	 large,	
because	as	a	rule	they	represent	 the	main	sector	of	 the	economic	activities	 in	
these	countries.	Therefore,	the	effect	of	rent-seeking	on	the	organizational	design	
of	the	governmental	programs	is	significant	overall6.	
A	 second	 area	 where	 governance,	 transparency	 and	 accountability	
remain	 important	 regards	 macroeconomic	 developments	 and	 the	 design	 and	
5	 	The	 literature	 to	 date	 offers	 a	 rich	 discussion	 and	explanation	 of	 the	 differentials	 that	 the	
existing	funds	experience	in	their	governance,	transparency	and	accountability	standards.	Moreover,	
a	 significant	 amount	of	work	 looks	 into	 the	 role	 that	 various	parties	 such	as	 the	government,	 the	




6  Stigler (1975) and Posner (1975) demonstrated that the latter can be particularly observed in the area 
of regulation.
52                                                                                                                                   
implementation	 of	 fiscal	 policy	 in	 particular.	 Links	 to	 fiscal	 policy	 emerge	 as	
particularly	 important	 in	 a	 saving	 context	 (Kalyuzhnova,	 2006).	 In	 successful	
cases	funds	should	ensure	significant	public	savings.	For	 instance	 in	 the	case	





highlights	 the	 critical	 link	 between	 the	 fund	 operations,	 in	 this	 case	 serving	 a	
















In	 the	 context	 of	 preventing	 corruption,	 conflicting	 interests	 between	 the	
public	 and	 the	 private	 sector	 and	misuse	 of	SWFs’	 assets	 at	macroeconomic	
levels,	the	role	of	strong	governance,	transparency	and	accountability	in	SWFs	
remain	 important.	 The	 presence	 of	 SWFs	 poses	 great	 policy,	 political	 and	
economic	challenges.	Among	others,	these	are	related	to	the	prudent	mobilization	
of	the	revenues,	to	the	fair	allocation	of	the	resources	between	generations,	to	




or	 so	 as	 to	 promote	 political	 goals,	 successful	 performance	might	 not	 be	 the	
case.	In	the	presence	of	strong	governance	and	adequate	mechanisms	that	can	





governance	 structures	 are	 robust.	 Governance	 structures	 that	 can	 guarantee	
a	voice	 for	all	and	adequate	 representation	of	different	groups	 in	 the	decision	
making	process	may	prevent	any	tensions	or	any	politically	motivated	investments	
of	the	SWFs.	Moreover,	the	clear	understanding	of	the	governance	structure	of	
the	 funds	regarding	 the	adequate	provision	of	 transparency	and	accountability	
in	 their	operations	may	help	 in	 the	 identification	of	any	political	objectives	 that	




Governance,	 transparency	and	accountability	aspects	remain	 important	 for	
the	welcoming	of	the	SWFs	in	the	international	financial	markets	and	the	recipient	
countries	 of	 SWF	 investments.	Global	 imbalances	 deriving	 from	 large	 current	
account	deficits	in	major	economies,	like	that	of	the	USA,	and	counterbalancing	
large	surpluses	 in	Asian	and	oil-producing	countries,	have	attracted	significant	






	 In	 the	 current	 global	 financial	 developments	 SWFs	 are	 perceived	 as	
representing	 a	 permanent	 redirection	 in	 investment	 flows	 and	 a	 shift	 in	 the	
dominant	sources	of	financial	capital	 (Ahmadov	et	al,	2009).	With	 these	flows,	
SWFs	 suggest	 a	 redistribution	 of	 financial	 and	 political	 capital	 throughout	 the	
world.	In	this	reality	the	presence	of	a	blurring	line	between	finance	and	politics	
raises	 concerns	 that	 SWFs	will	 be	 used	 illegitimately	 to	 advance	 political,	 as	
opposed	to	commercial,	agendas.	In	many	cases	SWFs	may	even	be	perceived	
as	 a	 source	 of	 state	 financial	 capitalism.	This	 can	 trigger	 further	 concerns	 on	
whether	 the	 introduction	 of	 public	 investors	 into	 private	 markets	 will	 do	 for	
efficiency.	In	this	respect	clear	governance	strictures	and	provision	of	adequate	
transparency	 and	accountability	 regarding	SWFs’	 governance,	 operations	 and	
investments	would	 ease	 the	 concerns	 of	 the	 recipient	 countries	while	 it	 could	
further	facilitate	their	operations	in	the	international	financial	arena.	
Any	assessment	attempt	of	the	SWFs	has	to	address	a	set	of	questions	and	
to	 further	 choose	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 assessment	 employed.	 For	 instance,	
any	assessment	attempts	would	have	to	consider	the	key	objectives	assigned	to	
the	funds	(such	as	stabilization	and/or	saving).	In	addition	the	framework	should	







It	 is	 important	 for	every	 fund	 to	clearly	 indicate	who	 is	managing	 the	 fund.	
For	 instance	 the	Norwegian	 fund	 is	managed	by	 the	Norwegian	Central	Bank	
according	to	the	Ministry	of	Finance	guidelines.	The	Alaska	Permanent	Reserve	
Fund	 is	 managed	 by	 the	Alaska	 Permanent	 Fund	 Corporation	 while	 external	
managers	handle	equity,	fixed	income	and	real	estate	portfolios.	The	last	but	not	
least	set	of	criteria	of	success	should	be	connected	with	a	high	level	of	transparency	
of	 fund	 operations.	 Every	 fund	 necessitates	 professional	 management.	 If	 the	
fund	has	 independent	 spending	authority,	 that	 could	undermine	 the	budgetary	
process.	Moreover,	regular	reporting	and	audit	are	quite	important.	In	addition	the	
management	of	the	fund	needs	to	maintain	public	awareness	about	the	existence	
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of	the	fund.	
To	date,	 several	 assessment	attempts	of	 the	SWFs	have	been	developed	
from	 scholars,	 Western	 Financial	 Institutions	 and	 independent	 organizations	
(Truman,	2008;	SWF	Institute,	IMF,	etc).	All	of	these	assessment	attempts	have	
identified	governance,	transparency	and	accountability	as	of	primary	importance	
to	 the	 successful	 performance	 of	 the	 SWFs.	 The	 majority	 of	 them	 offer	 a	
qualitative	approach	 to	 the	assessment	of	 the	SWF,	while	 later	efforts	attempt	
a	 quantitative	 approach	 to	 SWF	 rankings.	 Indicative	 of	 these	 efforts	 are	 the	
Truman	(2008)	scoreboard	and	 the	Sovereign	Wealth	Fund	 Institute	Linaburg-
Maduell	 Transparency	 Index.	 Both	 of	 the	 latter	 attempts	 have	 developed	 a	
classification	system	of	the	existing	funds	assessing	governance,	transparency	
and	accountability	aspects	along	financial	aspects	of	the	SWFs.	
Following	 the	 growing	 international	 demand	 for	 SWFs’	 governance,	
transparency	 and	 accountability	 fostering,	 the	 International	Working	Group	on	
the	SWFs	has	developed	the	“Santiago	Principles”7.	The	principles	have	been	a	
reflection	of	the	increasing	demand	for	clear	governance,	adequate	transparency	
and	accountability,	and	 integration	of	 the	SWFs	with	 the	 international	financial	
markets.	The	purpose	of	the	principles	is	to	identify	a	set	of	generally	accepted	
practices	that	can	reflect	appropriate	governance,	transparency	and	accountability	
arrangements	as	well	 as	 to	promote	SWF	 investments	based	upon	a	prudent	
and	sound	economic	basis.	Acceptance	of	the	principles	will	allow	the	respective	
countries	 and	 funds	 to	 gain	 greater	 understanding	 at	 home	 and	 in	 recipient	
countries	as	well	as	in	the	international	financial	markets.
Overall	clear	governance	structures	and	adequate	provision	of	transparency	














3. SWFs, governance, transparency and accountability:
Assessing rankings, benchmarks and best practices
SWFs	 vary	 in	 objectives	 and	 size,	 and	 further,	 they	 operate	 in	 countries	
that	differ	 in	terms	of	governmental	structures.	In	this	respect	any	comparative	
assessment	 has	 to	 overcome	 significant	 difficulties.	 However	 the	 extraction	
of	 a	 set	 of	 core	 elements	 that	 remain	 important	 for	 all	 the	 SWFs’	 short	 term	
7		International	Working	Group	on	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds	(2008).









employing	 the	prism	of	political	economy	 for	 the	cases	of	Norway,	Venezuela,	
Mexico,	Saudi	Arabia,	Nigeria,	 Indonesia	 and	Chad,	 concluding	 that	 technical	
solutions	such	as	 the	setting	up	of	 resource-based	 funds	will	 not	work	unless	
supportive	constituencies	are	developed	in	support	of	such	measures.
Similar	attempts	to	offer	a	policy	brief	on	oil	revenue	management	by	oil	funds	
is	made	 by	 the	 Friends	 of	 Earth	 (2002).	With	 a	 reference	 and	 a	 comparative	
analysis	 of	 the	 cases	 of	 Chad,	 Azerbaijan,	 Kazakhstan	 and	 Uganda	 the	
assessment	concludes	 that	 in	 the	absence	of	 real	political	will,	 so	as	 to	allow	
public	 scrutiny	 and	 participation	 in	 resource	 management	 and	 the	 decision-
making	process,	funds	will	fail	to	address	core	issues	of	civic	empowerment	and	
democratic	 development.	 Kalyuzhnova	 (2006),	 comparing	 and	 contrasting	 the	
oil	funds	of	Azerbaijan	and	Kazakhstan,	suggests	that	the	key	requirements	for	
successful	performance	of	 funds	 lie	upon	governance	 issues.	 In	an	attempt	 to	
address	the	problem	of	oil	wealth	management	and	mineral	funds	in	the	Caspian	
region	Tsalik	(2003)	incorporates	the	evidence	from	the	funds	of	Azerbaijan	and	
Kazakhstan	 into	 a	 wider	 set	 of	 oil	 funds.	 In	 a	 comparative	 review	 the	 author	
concludes	 that	 the	 oil	 funds	 of	 Norway,	Alaska	 and	Alberta	 can	 be	 proposed	
as	 successful	 fund	 models.	 Bacon	 and	 Tordo	 (2006)	 attempt	 a	 comparative	
analysis	 and	 classification	 of	 a	 set	 of	 resource-based	 funds	 building	 a	 more	
systematic	method	of	comparison.	The	assessment	is	based	on	a	set	of	funding	
and	 operational	 aspects.	 The	 authors	 suggest	 governance,	 transparency	 and	
accountability	to	be	key	success	factors	that	allowed	certain	funds	to	be	better	
performers	than	others.









of	 this	assessment	offer	a	scoreboard	 that	quantifies	 the	degree	of	successful	
performance	for	a	wider	set	of	funds	considering	a	range	of	different	assessment	
elements	(Table	1).	
The	 Truman	 (2008)	 scoreboard	 indicates	 that	 in	 a	 comparative	 analysis,	
pension	funds	are	related	to	better	scores	of	governance,	structure,	transparency,	
accountability	and	behavior.	When	considering	non-pension	funds,	the	SWFs	of	
USA	and	Norway	score	higher	 in	 the	ranking	system	while	 the	Gulf	Countries’	
SWFs	 perform	 relatively	 lower.	 The	 scoreboard	 provides	 and	 indication	 of	
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standards	 and	 requirements	 that	 SWFs	 can	 fulfill	 without	 providing	 more	
information	 or	 being	more	 exposed	 than	 other	 funds.	 In	 troubled	 times,	 such	
as	 the	 latest	financial	 turmoil,	 the	 indication	of	such	scoreboards	can	highlight	
differentials	 and	 possible	 particularities	 that	 are	 related	 to	 each	 specific	 fund.	
Moreover,	 it	 can	 provide	 information	 and	 fair	 predictability	 of	 the	 nature	 and	
decision-making	process	of	the	respective	funds,	lowering	the	speculative	risk,	
discontent	and	generated	ambiguity	over	the	role	and	the	investment	purposes	
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Singapore Temasek	Holdings 50 50 61 0 45
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In	an	attempt	to	assess	SWFs’	transparency	and	accountability	provision,	the	
“Linaburg-Maduell	Transparency	 Index”	has	been	developed	by	 the	Sovereign	
Wealth	 Fund	 Institute	 researchers8.	 This	 is	 based	 on	 Norway’s	 SWF,	 widely	
seen	 as	 the	 benchmark	 of	 transparency.	 The	 index	 implements	 10	 “essential	
8		http://www.swfinstitute.org/research/transparencyindex.php
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principles”9.	For	each	principle	assessed	there	are	different	levels	of	depth,	the	
judgment	of	which	is	left	to	the	discretion	of	the	Sovereign	Wealth	Fund	Institute.	
The	 index	 results	 in	 a	 transparency	 index	 rating	 from	 1	 to	 10	 (Table	 2),	 with	
8	 recommended	 from	 the	 Sovereign	 Wealth	 Fund	 Institute	 in	 order	 to	 claim	





when	 considering	 the	 funds	 established	 in	 the	Caspian	 region.	 The	 State	Oil	







Table 2. Linaburg - Maduell Transparency Index10

























































The	 overview	 of	 the	 different	 ranking	 attempts	 reveals	 some	 interesting	
information	with	regards	to	fund	level	performance.	First,	the	fund	of	Norway	is	





The	 Norwegian	 fund	 remains	 by	 far	 the	most	 examined	 and	 best	 performing	
fund,	especially	when	governance,	transparency	and	accountability	aspects	are	




a	prototype	and	a	 successful	 performer	 should	not	be	exaggerated,	while	 the	
type	specifics	of	the	countries/funds	that	are	called	to	implement	similar	practices	





scoreboard	attempts,	such	as	 the	Truman	 (2008)	scoreboard	or	 the	Linaburg-
Maduell	 Transparency	 Index,	 should	 consider	 the	 subjective	 nature	 of	 the	
indexes	and	the	bias	that	the	latter	can	create.	For	instance,	in	the	SWF	Institute	
Linaburg-Maduell	 Transparency	 Index,	 for	 each	 principle	 assessed	 there	 are	
different	 levels	of	depth,	 the	 judgment	of	which	reflects	the	 judgments	and	the	
discretion	of	 the	Sovereign	Wealth	Fund	Institute.	This	 is	 indicative	of	 the	 lack	
of	objective	qualitative	assessment	that	may	be	present	in	the	existing	rankings	
and	 scoreboards.	This	 can	 be	 further	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 fact	 that	SWFs	are	
often	 required	 to	 assess	 their	 own	 constituents.	 The	 available	 rankings	 and	
benchmarks	 are	 largely	 developed	 based	 on	 the	 available	 public	 information	
on	 the	SWFs.	Nevertheless,	 in	 some	 cases	 these	 facts	 have	 been	 confirmed	
with	the	funds	themselves.	 In	 this	respect	 the	funds	are	called	to	comment	on	
their	own	constituents.	Hence	the	conflict	of	 interests	 that	may	emerge	for	 the	
assessed	SWFs	might	bias	the	provided	information	and	the	derived	estimation	
results,	rankings	and	scoreboards.








was	 well-developed	 (Cappelen	 and	 Mjoset,	 2009).	 Nevertheless,	 the	 scale	
of	 the	discovery	was	 large	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 total	 size	of	 the	economy	and	 it	
has	 continued	 to	 grow	 considerably.	Over	 the	 last	 decade,	 oil	 and	gas	have	
accounted	for	about	17%	of	GDP	and	40%	of	exports.	Since	the	very	beginning	
of	oil	development,	questions	were	raised	in	fear	of	“Dutch	disease”	about	how	









of	 the	 fund	 has	 been	 entrusted	 to	 the	Ministry	 of	 Finance.	 Since	 1996	 the	
Ministry	 has	 delegated	 responsibility	 for	 management	 to	 the	 Central	 Bank	
(Norges	 Bank).	 Norges	 Bank	 has	 further	 contracted	 external	managers	 for	
part	of	the	portfolio	but	it	has	also	managed	a	large	part	of	the	portfolio	itself.	
From	 the	 very	 beginning,	 all	 the	 investments	 of	 the	 fund	 have	 been	made	




establishing	 act	 the	 deficit	 on	 the	 government	 non-oil	 budget,	 determined	
by	the	Parliament,	is	paid	out	of	the	fund	while	surpluses	remain	in	the	fund	
(Bacon	and	Tordo,	2006).	In	this	respect	neither	the	income	nor	the	capital	of	
























Committee),	 the	Ministry	of	Finance	 issued	new	guidelines	with	 regards	 to	ethical	 investments	
undertaken	by	the	fund.
3		As	of	2006.
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Attempts	such	as	those	of	Truman	(2008)	or	the	SWF	Institute	Transparency	





















the	 need	 for	 the	 international	 financial	 markets,	 the	 International	 Financial	
institutions	and	independent	countries	to	understand	the	role	of	SWFs.	This	has	
come	 as	 an	 outcome	 of	 the	 realization	 that	 SWFs	 are	 becoming	 increasingly	
important	participants	in	the	international	financial	system.	In	addition,	recipient	




political	 controversy	 related	 to	SWFs	not	only	 in	 the	 recipient	 countries	but	 in	
many	cases	in	the	host	countries	as	well.		
The	 contrasting	 nature	 of	 what	might	 be	 done	with	 the	 fund,	 and	what	
has	actually	been	done,	illustrates	the	strong	discipline	of	the	Storting.	Such	
structure	 could	 be	 particularly	 vulnerable	 to	 a	 political	 election	 cycle,	 and	
over	longer	periods,	this	may	prove	to	be	an	important	factor	in	the	use	of	the	




democratic	 process.	 In	 short,	 the	 operation	 and	management	 of	 the	NGPF	
has	been	successful	in	accumulating	funds	for	the	Norwegian	state.	It	remains	
to	 be	 seen	 whether	 the	 aggressive	 saving	 of	 oil	 funds	 and	 sophisticated	
investment	 policies	 followed	 by	 the	 government	 will	 be	 able	 to	 accumulate	
sufficient	funds	to	finance	future	spending	needs	at	a	time	when	oil	production	
will	be	in	decline.





governance,	 transparency	and	accountability	standards	 that	are	needed	 in	 the	
international	financial	markets	rather	than	with	what	would	be	adequate	for	the	
citizens	of	 the	host	countries.	For	 instance,	 in	cases	 like	 that	of	Azerbaijan	or	
Kazakhstan,	the	attempts	of	the	respective	funds	to	improve	their	governance,	




accountability	 leading	 to	 significant	 improvements	 in	 the	 respective	 ranking	
attempts	such	as	the	Linaburg-Maduell	transparency	index.	






funds	 remain	 governed	 by	 presidential	 decrees.	 Thus	 the	 funds	 emerge	 as	
the	 “king	 (under	 the	 pressure	 of	 the	 IMF)	 binding	 his	 own	 hands	 by	 his	 own	





been	 aiming	 at	 addressing	 primarily	 concerns	 raised	 by	Western	 countries13.	
The	Santiago	Principles	have	developed	in	an	attempt	to	put	Western	concerns	







In	 the	 same	 way,	 the	 Santiago	 Principles	 develop	 from	 an	 international	
perspective,	 hence	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 towards	 the	 citizens	 of	
the	 host	 countries	 is	 not	 addressed	 to	 the	 same	 extent.	 The	 effectiveness	 of	
such	initiatives	and	the	degree	to	which	they	can	benefit	the	citizens	of	the	host	
countries	can	be	further	challenged	once	the	voluntary	nature	of	the	commitment	




13	 	Several	scholars	consider	 the	Santiago	Principles	as	 the	outcome	of	 the	 influence	of	a	
group	of	Western	Countries.	For	a	detailed	discussion	see	Rose	(2008).
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implementations	and	enforcement	 limitations	present	 in	 the	very	nature	of	 the	
Santiago	 Principles	 are	 taken	 into	 consideration.	 In	 this	 respect,	 views	 range	
from	considering	 the	Santiago	Principles	deficient	 (Rose,	2008)	 to	a	“band-aid	
over	a	gaping	wound”	(Wong,	2009).	
Overall	 governance,	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 improvements	 of	 the	
SWFs	 remain	 a	 core	 aspect	 of	 their	 effectiveness	 and	 their	 success.	 This	 is	
related	not	only	 to	 the	 international	welcoming	of	 the	SWFs	but	 to	 the	benefit	












of	 greater	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 towards	 the	 citizens	 of	 the	 host	
countries.	The	latter	can	significantly	reduce	the	margin	for	misinterpretation	in	
such	initiatives	and	in	the	identified	best	practices.	
4. Conclusion and policy recommendations
The	 experience	 to	 date	 suggests	 that	 strong	 governance	 structures,	
transparency	 and	 accountability	 remain	 key	 factors	 of	 success	 for	 the	SWFs.	
Success	 is	 related	 to	 the	welcoming	of	 the	SWFs	 in	 the	 international	financial	
arena	as	key	players	and	to	the	welcoming	of	their	investments	in	the	recipient	
countries.	In	addition,	success	is	related	to	the	ease	of	controversy	surrounding	
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the	lines	of	the	development	and	the	establishment	of	a	set	of	generally	accepted	
best	 practices	 as	 suggested	 by	 organizations	 like	 the	OECD,	 by	 International	
Financial	 Institutions	 such	 as	 the	 IMF,	 or	 by	 individual	 countries	 or	 group	 of	
countries	like	the	USA	or	the	EU.	
The	most	 characteristic	of	 such	attempts	 remains	 the	Santiago	Principles.	
Similar	 to	 the	 earlier	 attempts,	 the	 Santiago	 Principles	 reflect	 in	 large	 part	
Western	worries	and	the	need	of	international	financial	markets	for	transparency	
and	accountability	provision	 from	 the	participating	financial	actors	such	as	 the	
SWFs.	Nevertheless,	the	need	for	strong	governance	structures	and	the	provision	
of	 adequate	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 towards	 the	 citizens	 of	 the	 host	





The	 overview	 of	 the	 assessment	 attempts,	 the	 scoreboards	 of	SWFs	 and	
the	 proposed	 fund	 benchmarks	 and	 best	 practices	 developed	 to	 date	 further	
indicate	 the	 necessity	 of	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 their	 particularities	 and	
their	methodological	 limitations.	The	subjective	nature	of	 the	criteria	employed	
and	 the	assessment	provided,	 the	 international	perspective	employed	and	 the	
conflicting	interests	involved	might	hinder	the	estimation	results	and	consequent	
recommendations.	Moreover,	the	adoption	of	specific	fund	cases	as	benchmarks	
might	 not	 be	 applicable	 to	 every	 single	 fund	 and	 country.	 Macroeconomic	
differentials,	 the	 pace	 of	 institutional	 development	 and	 integration,	 and	 fiscal	
needs	might	render	the	“one-size-fits-all”	approach	unrealistic.	On	the	other	hand,	
the	vast	discrepancies	between	different	 funds	and	 their	performance	 indicate	
that	they	cannot	be	studied	in	a	group	or	assessed	against	each	other	unless	a	
set	of	generally	accepted	principles	and	practices	is	put	in	place.	





economic	 balances	has	made	many	 international	 organizations	 and	 individual	
countries	highlight	 the	need	 for	 the	establishment	of	a	generally	accepted	set	
of	 practices	 and	 standards	 of	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 to	 be	 adopted	
by	 the	SWFs.	 In	addition	many	Western	countries	have	clarified	 their	position	
towards	the	investments	made	by	the	SWF	and	their	final	legitimacy	to	protect	
their	national	interests.
In	 this	 respect	 policymakers	 and	 international	 financial	 institutions	 should	
keep	working	on	fostering	the	existing	sets	of	best	practices	and	on	promoting	
the	active	engagement	of	 the	SWFs	and	 the	respective	countries	 to	 the	 latter.	
Nevertheless,	 these	attempts	should	not	disregard	 that	 little	provision	 is	made	
in	 the	 existing	 practices	 for	 the	 fostering	 of	 governance,	 transparency	 and	
accountability	 towards	 the	 citizens	 of	 the	 countries	 that	 remain	 the	 legitimate	
beneficiaries	 of	 the	 fund	 operations	 and	 the	 ultimate	 domestic	 monitoring	
apparatus.		Systematic	monitoring	of	the	SWFs	against	the	set	of	good	practices	
and	 international	 benchmarks	 should	 continue.	 Nevertheless,	 this	 should	
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develop	so	as	to	further	ensure	that	the	citizens	benefit	from	SWFs	operations	
and	 investments	 and	 they	 receive	 full	 transparency	 and	 accountability.	 If	 this	
parameter	 is	 not	 taken	 into	 serious	 consideration	 the	 assessed	 and	 recorded	
levels	 of	 governance	 strengthening	 might	 merely	 monitor	 superficial	 public	
demonstrations	of	 transparency	and	accountability	without	essentially	affecting	
the	underlying	power	relationships.	
In	 order	 to	 strengthen	governance,	 transparency	and	accountability	 of	 the	
SWFs:
1. International initiatives should keep working on the fostering of good 
governance, transparency and accountability practices and on their being 
embraced by a larger group of SWFs.	Experience	with	successful	SWFs	should	
be	used	as	a	starting	point	so	as	 to	derive	a	set	of	governance,	 transparency	
and	accountability	practices	 that	can	 foster	 the	efficiency	and	 the	 international	
welcoming	 of	 the	 SWFs.	 Systematic	 monitoring	 of	 SWFs	 against	 the	 set	 of	
good	 practices	 and	 international	 benchmarks	 should	 continue.	 Nevertheless,	





2. Employment of the existing SWF rankings and scoreboards should 
acknowledge their international perspective and the methodological 
limitations present. These	might	significantly	affect	the	obtained	rankings	and	
the	subsequent	 recommendations.	 In	 this	area	 the	 international	organizations,	
the	 International	 Financial	 Institutions,	 individual	 countries	 and	SWFs	 have	 to	
further	work	on	improving	the	existing	methodology	employed.	At	the	same	time	
any	 assessment	making	 use	 of	 the	 scoreboards	 and	 rankings	 to	 date	 should	
carefully	consider	whether	the	recorded	improvements	of	changes	represent	real	
changes	in	the	existing	power	relationships.
 3. The ranking attempts and the international initiatives on best practices 
should not disregard the fact that the citizens of the countries remain the 
ultimate beneficiaries of the SWF investments and operations.	Citizens	can	
further	provide	valuable	support	 in	monitoring	 the	politically	motivated	uses	of	
the	SWFs	or	the	political	misuse	of	the	accumulated	assets.	In	this	respect,	any	
assessment	 attempts	 should	 further	 consider	 governance,	 transparency	 and	
accountability	developments	vis-à-vis	the	citizens	of	the	countries.	International	
initiatives	can	be	used	as	 leverage	 in	 fostering	governance,	 transparency	and	
accountability	changes	not	only	 towards	 the	 international	markets	but	 towards	
the	citizens	of	the	countries	as	well.
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State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan Republic: 






        
Throughout	 the	 former	socialist	camp,	Azerbaijan	was	 the	first	 to	establish	
a	stabilization	 fund	 for	 the	accumulation	of	 income	 from	hydrocarbon	exports,	
and	 in	 late	 1999,	 by	 a	 special	 decree	of	 the	President,	 the	State	Oil	 Fund	of	
Azerbaijan	Republic	(SOFAZ)	was	founded.	Establishment	of	the	Fund	coincided	
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SOFAZ’s history and governance principles 
The	State	Oil	Fund	of	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan	(SOFAZ)	was	established	in	
accordance	with	the	decree	of	the	President	of	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan	dated	
December	 29,	 1999	 “On	Establishment	 of	 the	State	Oil	 Fund	 of	 the	Republic	
of	Azerbaijan.”	Statutory	Regulations	 of	 the	State	Oil	 Fund	of	 the	Republic	 of	
Azerbaijan	were	approved	by	the	President	of	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan	dated	
December	29,	2000.	The	cornerstone	of	the	philosophy	behind	the	Oil	Fund	was	
to	 ensure	 intergenerational	 equality	 of	 benefit	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 country’s	 oil	
wealth,	whilst	 improving	 the	 economic	well-being	 of	 the	 population	 today	 and	
safeguarding	economic	security	for	future	generations1.	







of	 the	 non-oil	 sector;	 (ii)	 taking	 into	 account	 that	 oil	 and	 gas	 are	 deployable	
resources	 ensuring	 intergenerational	 equality	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 country’s	 oil	
wealth	and	to	accumulate	and	preserve	oil	revenues	for	future	generations;	(iii)	
financing	major	national	scale	projects	to	support	socio-economic	progress.	







SOFAZ	Supervisory	 Board.	 Civil	 society’s	 participation	 in	 the	management	 of	
SOFAZ	hasn’t	been	implemented	yet.	
SOFAZ’s	daily	management	is	vested	with	the	Executive	Director,	appointed	
by	 and	 accountable	 to	 the	 President.	 SOFAZ’s	 Executive	 Director	 as	 a	 chief	
executive	officer	 is	 vested	with	 the	powers	 to	be	a	 legal	 representative	of	 the	
Fund,	 organize	 and	 conduct	 business	 of	 the	 Fund	 including	 appointment	 and	
dismissal	 of	 employees,	management	 and	 disbursement	 of	 the	 assets	 of	 the	
Fund	 in	 conformity	 with	 the	 rules	 and	 regulations	 approved	 by	 the	 President	
of	Azerbaijan.	The	Executive	Director	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	preparation	of	 the	
annual	budget	of	SOFAZ,	incorporating	an	annual	program	of	the	Fund’s	assets	
utilization,	and	its	submission	for	the	approval	of	the	President	of	Azerbaijan.
Regarding	 “Decree	 of	 the	 President	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Azerbaijan	 on	
establishment	of	the	State	Oil	Fund	of	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan”	(29.12.1999)	
SOFAZ	 fulfilled	 its	operations	 through	a	special	account	of	 the	National	Bank.	
SOFAZ	 is	 accountable	 and	 responsible	 to	 the	 President	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	
Azerbaijan.	The	Fund	is	an	extra-budgetary	institution.	The	Fund	is	a	legal	entity	
1		http://www.oilfund.az			
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and	must	have	a	settlement	account	and	other	accounts	at	banking	institutions2.	A	
Supervisory	Board	exercises	general	control	over	establishment	and	spending	of	
the	Fund’s	assets.	The main responsibility of the Fund is to ensure collection 
and effective management of foreign currency and other assets that are 
generated from the implementation of agreements signed in the field of 
oil and gas exploration, and development, as well as from the Fund’s own 
activities, in the interest of citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan and their 
future generations. The	 Fund’s	 assets	 form	 on	 the	 account	 of	 the	 following	
sources:	
-	 Revenues	 generated	 from	 implementing	 agreements	 on	 exploration,	





















strategically	 significant	 infrastructure	 facilities	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 country’s	
socio-economic	progress.
For	decreasing	the	risks	in	the	management	of	the	Oil	Fund’s	foreign	currency	
assets,	 their	 limits	 shall	 be	 defined	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 following	 principles3:	
defining	credit	 risk,	 i.e.	maximum	 limit	of	 the	amount	 invested	 in	one	financial	









Fund	 of	 the	Republic	 of	Azerbaijan”	 approved	 by	 the	Decree	 of	 the	President	 of	 the	Republic	 of	
Azerbaijan	№	511	dated	June	19,	2001






consolidation	 of	 revenues	 and	 expenditures	 of	 the	 consolidated	 government.	
Effecting	of	any	expenditure	on	Oil	Fund’s	assets	extraneous	from	the	Oil	Fund’s	
budget	 by	 the	Oil	 Fund	 is	 inadmissible.	 Expenditures	 that	 can	 arise	 from	 the	












the	 period	 2005-2025,	 establishes	 the	 principles	 for	 the	 use	 of	 oil	 and	 gas	





term	expenditures	 from	oil	 and	gas	 revenues,	 the	 ‘constant	 real	expenditures’	








and	 expenditures	 of	 the	 consolidated	 budget	 of	 the	 country,	 excluding	 the	 oil	
sector)	and	taking	account	of	the	long-term	expenditure	limit.	Sharp	year-to-year	
fluctuations	 in	expenditures	are	undesirable	and	 the	non-oil	deficit	may	not	be	
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sector	and	 the	gradual	 reduction	 in	 the	dependence	on	oil	and	gas	 revenues.	
The	development	of	the	non-oil	sector	based	on	the	use	of	long-term	oil	and	gas	












NGO	Coalition	 that	 the	main	 regulatory	document	 should	be	 law.	Azerbaijani 

















of	 these	 territories	 and	 returning	 of	 refugees	 to	 their	 homeland.	 The	 Fund’s	








principles	 prepared	 by	 the	Supervision	 Board	 are	 applied	 to	 the	 investments;	
the	state	authorities	without	a	strategic	plan	may	not	be	allotted	any	funds;	the	
share	 in	 the	 inter-country	 investments	 by	 small	 and	 average	 enterprises	may	
not	 exceed	30%.	Fund	assets	may	be	assigned	 to	 finance	projects	 aiming	at	





generated	by	the	Fund	within	a	year	 is	 to	be	directed	towards	financing	of	 the	
social	 investment	 programs.	 The	 financing	within	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 social	
investment	programs	is	assigned	to	the	civil	community	institutions	based	on	the	
competitions	carried	out	according	 to	 the	 rules	determined	by	 the	Supervisory	
Board.	 The	 expenditure	 of	 assets	 allotted	 for	 projects’	 implementation	 will	 be	
under	 control	 of	 the	 Supervisory	 Board.	 The amount transferred from the 




















and	 to	 generate	 revenues	 by	 effective	management.	 Outside	 the	Republic	 of	
Azerbaijan,	the	current	accounts	of	the	Oil	Fund	should	be	opened	with	banks	
rated	 by	 reputable	 international	 rating	 agencies	 such	 as	 Standard	 &	 Poor’s,	
Moody’s	and	Fitch	with	a	long-term	credit	rating	not	lower	than:	“AA-”	as	defined	
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than	the	credit	ratings	A	(Standard	&	Poor’s,	Fitch)	or	A2	(Moody’s);	in	US	Dollars	
or	in	US	Dollars,	Euro	and	GBP	based	on	their	respective	weight6.
Source: State Oil Fund, author calculations
According	to	investment	policy,	up	to	60%	of	the	Fund's	investment	portfolio	
can	be	managed	by	external	managers.	The	assets	given	to	an	external	manager	
cannot	 exceed	 15%	 of	 the	 total	 amount	 of	 the	 investment	 portfolio.	 SOFAZ's	
investment	portfolio	should	not	be	invested	in	currency	arbitrage,	swaps,	forwards	
and	 futures	 (except	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 hedging	 or	 optimizing	 the	 currency	
composition	 of	 the	 investment	 portfolio	 and	 structure	 of	 the	SOFAZ’s	 assets),	
precious	metals	and	stones,	or	real	estate.



































percent	 -	AA,	 27.55	 percent	 -	A,	 7.09	 percent	 -	 BBB,	 0.04	 percent	 accounts	
for	other.	SOFAZ's	assets	have	been	placed	partly	 in	securities	and	monetary	













of	 the	Fund’s	 income	 (93.4%)	was	provided	by	 the	profit	 table	sale	of	oil	 and	
gas.	 It’s	probably	 impossible	to	evaluate	the	economic-budget	model	of	recent	
years	without	 the	SOFAZ	 /	 state	 budget	 relationship.	The	 transfers	 of	 the	Oil	
Fund	 to	 the	budget	as	of	2003	gave	a	start	 to	 this	 relationship.	The	growth	of	
these	transfers	year	by	year	and	its	budget	share	of	almost	50%	at	the	present	





year.	The	 increase	 of	 the	 amount	 of	 transfers	 directs	 the	 attention	 to	 SOFAZ	
and	 necessitates	 the	 acceptance	 of	 fiscal	 policy	 guidelines	 based	 on	 serious	







The	 concern	 related	 to	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	 dependence	 upon	 oil	 factor	 is	
already	quite	obvious	in	2010.	Thus it’s clear that the tendency of the Oil Fund 
to become the main donor of the state budget is growing and reaching a level 
7		Dr.	İngilab	Ahmadov,	Kanan	Aslanli,	Shahriyar	Ahmadov.	“Global	economic	crisis	and	state	
budget:	The	case	of	Azerbaijan”,	National	Budget	Group,	Baku	2010
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that can become dangerous for the continuous development perspectives of the 
economy. When	reviewing	the	dynamics	of	the	link	between	the	state	budget	and	
SOFAZ,	things	become	fairly	clear.	
Share of SOFAZ transfers in budget incomes
Source: National Budget Group
If	the	amount	of	Oil	Fund	transfers	to	the	state	budget	was	100	million	AZN	
in	2003,	 the	figure	went	up	 to	130	million	 in	2004,	 to	150	million	 in	2005,	585	
million	in	2006,	another	585	million	in	2007,	1.1	million	in	2008	and	4.9	billion	in	
2009	and	finally	4.915	billion	in	2010.	However,	the	point	of	concern	is	not	only	




shall	 be	 accumulated	 for	 the	 coming	 generations	 during	 the	 peak	 periods.	
Without	a	doubt,	the	lack	of	precise	standardization	mechanisms	in	the	above-
mentioned	 strategy	makes	 it	more	 complicated	 to	 legally	 evaluate	 how	much	
the	management	of	Oil	Fund	resources	 in	2010	complies	with	 the	Presidential	
decree.	And	 namely	 this	 fact	 makes	 it	 necessary	 to	 accept	 a	 perfect	 law	 on	
SOFAZ.	Such	a	 law	would	also	eliminate	 the	problem	of	 the	missing	 limitation	
mechanism.	 It’s	worthwhile	 to	mention	 that	 the	EITI	NGO	coalition	 functioning	
in	Azerbaijan	 has	 carried	 out	 continuous	 activities	 in	 this	 field	 and	 developed	
the	project	of	 the	Law	on	“Oil	Fund.”	Despite	all	 this,	 the	decision	of	 the	Fund	
to	spend	the	greatest	portion	of	 its	resources	obtained	during	 the	crisis	period	
indicates	to	 its	 tendency	to	solve	the	problem	of	 the	shortage	of	means	of	 the	
state	treasury	through	an	easier	way	under	an	unfavorable	economic	condition.	
When	taking	a	look	at	the	dynamics	of	SOFAZ	profitability	and	budget	transfers	
we	 come	up	with	 some	curious	outcomes.	Though	not	 observed	 in	 2007,	 the	
increase	of	budget	transfers	against	the	decrease	of	tension	in	2008	and	2009	
 


























persons,	 130.0	million	manat	 and	 120.0	million	manat	were	 accordingly	 used	
for	 financing	 the	 reconstruction	 of	 the	 Samur-Absheron	 irrigation	 system	 and	
financing	 construction	 of	 the	 Oghuz-Gabala-Baku	 water	 supply	 system.	 22.1	
million	manat	were	directed	to	financing	Baku-Tbilisi-Kars	railway	and	7.9	million	
manat	 to	 financing	 «The	 state	 program	on	 the	 education	 of	Azerbaijani	 youth	
abroad	 in	 the	 years	 2007-2015.»	 The	 Fund's	 administrative	 and	 operational	
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Table 1. Dynamics of transfers from SOFAZ to state budget
Years
SOFAZ’s transfers to 










2003 100 -- 8.2% 41%
2004 130 30.0% 8.6% 77%
2005 150 15.4% 7.2% 70%
2006 585 290.0% 15.6% 59.6%
2007 585 0.0% 9.7% 55.1%
2008 1100 88.0% 35.3% 88.5%
2009 4915 346.8% 40.4% 92.8%
2010 5915 20.3% 51.4% 90.5%
2011 9203 9.6% 58% 93%
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Source: National Budget Group, author calculations
If	the	oil	prices	and	expenses	of	the	Fund	remain	at	current	levels,	the	State	Oil	
Fund	can	accumulate	up	to	$50	billion.	Over	the	past	three	years,	the	resources	
of	SOFAZ	have	 increased	10	 times.	So	 far,	Azerbaijan	has	gained	about	 $40	




of	Fund’s	assets,	 in	 the	 future,	 the	 level	 of	 transfers	 to	 the	public	 budget	 can	
remain	at	current	levels	due	to	revenues	from	asset	management.	SOFAZ	has	
received	 $1	 billion	 from	 the	 asset	 management	 up	 to	 now.	 With	 a	 minimum	
profitability	on	assets	placed	at	5	percent,	after	15	years	we	can	reach	the	level	
of	$6	billion	income	from	asset	management	per	year.	If	we	continue	to	adhere	


























2008 2009 2010 2011
"Budget's revenue paradox": oil generated revenues  
(million AZN, 1 USD = 0.8 AZN)
Corporate profit tax SOFAZ's transfers Profit tax without ACG





to	 diversify	 funds	 in	 subsequent	 years	 in	 riskier	 assets,	 but	 one	 of	 the	 most	
important	 investments	 is	 education.	The	 fund	 is	 financing	 a	 special	 education	
program	allowing	Azerbaijani	citizens	to	receive	an	education	in	the	world’s	best	
universities.	 
SOFAZ’s durability in global turmoil
The	 global	 financial	 crisis	 affected	 the	 activity	 of	 SOFAZ	 only	 in	 view	
of	 its	 income	 cut.	 The	 State	Oil	 Fund	 does	 not	 face	 any	 difficulty	 due	 to	 the	
global	 financial	 crisis.	 SOFAZ	 held	 a	 conservative	 and	 protective	 position	 by	
foreknowing	the	crisis.	Therefore,	the	crisis	only	affected	the	fund's	 income.	At	
present	many	countries'	funds	have	lost	billions.	There	are	funds	which	devalued	
by	 30	 percent,	 but	 SOFAZ	 completed	 2008	 with	 income	 worth	 $300	 million.	
Therefore,	 there	will	not	be	any	problems	with	financing	projects	and	 it	will	be	
implemented	as	part	of	 the	budget.	The	SOFAZ	 funds	were	deposited	 in	high	


















caused	by	 a	 large	 flow	of	 hard	 currency	 as	 a	way	of	 investing	 «superfluous»	
money	outside	of	Azerbaijan.
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Source: National Budget Group, author calculations
Even	if	the	financial	crisis	has	affected	the	profitability	of	SOFAZ,	3.79	percent	
is	not	a	bad	figure	in	such	circumstances.	SOFAZ	has	proven	that	it	has	come	




obligations.	They	will	 be	 offered	 to	 diversify	 their	 portfolio	with	more	 lucrative	
financial	instruments.	Due	to	the	global	financial	process,	the	yield	from	SOFAZ	
funds	managed	by	foreigners	aside	from	the	WB	Treasury	was	close	to	zero	last	
year.	The	 foreign	managers	department	 runs	about	 $20	million,	 excluding	 the	
WB	Treasury's	 funds.	 	The	 few	 foreign	asset	management	companies	SOFAZ	
engaged	 included	Clariden	Leu	and	Deutsche	Asset	Management.	Earlier,	 the	
Fund	had	made	plans	 to	expand	 the	 list	 of	external	managers	 to	an	 increase	






the	world,	 so	we	expect	 the	 improvement	 of	 the	 situation	 in	world	markets	 to	
diversify	our	 investment	portfolio.	Earlier	 the	World	Bank	offered	Azerbaijan	 to	
reconsider	its	investment	policy	and	invest	into	more	risky	financial	instruments.	
Such	 long-term	 investments	 for	 a	 period	 of	 10-20	 years	 have	always	 justified	
themselves,	as	the	return	on	them	is	higher	than	on	bonds.	In	a	short	period	of	
time	the	situation	is	usually	resolved	and	the	stock	management	revenues	rise	
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(Reserve	Assets	 Management	 Program).	 Currently,	 the	World	 Bank	 Treasury	








these	 funds	will	be	managed	by	an	 IFC	asset	management	company.	This,	 in	






the	 Fund	 accumulated	 14	 billion	 900	million	 dollars	 of	 income,	 instead	 of	 the	
expected	approximately	$18	billion	in	assets.
SOFAZ’s transparency and accountability
SOFAZ	 represents	 Azerbaijan	 in	 the	 Extractive	 Industries	 Transparency	
Initiative	(EITI).		Thus,	the	country	has	the	opportunity	to	become	the	first	full	EITI	
member.	Additionally,	one	of	the	priorities	for	SOFAZ	is	to	assist	other	countries	
in	 the	 EITI.	 Kazakhstan,	 Yemen,	 Mongolia,	 Nigeria	 and	 other	 countries	 have	
applied	to	Azerbaijan	in	this	connection.	EITI	unites	26	members.	Azerbaijan	has	
an	opportunity	 to	 further	 improve	the	extractive	 industry	accountability	system.	
The	 multi-stakeholders	 group	 (consisting	 of	 SOFAZ	 and	 foreign	 companies)	











As	 an	 independent	 auditing	 and	 financial	 control	 body,	 The	 Chamber	 of	
Accounts	must	inform	the	society	about	the	results	of	the	budgetary	expenditure	




transparency	of	sovereign	wealth	 funds,	 including	SOFAZ.	One	of	 them	 is	 the	
Linaburg-Maduell	 Transparency	 Index	which	was	 developed	 at	 the	 Sovereign	
Wealth	 Fund	 Institute	 by	 Carl	 Linaburg	 and	 Michael	 Maduell.	 The	 Linaburg-
Maduell	 transparency	 index	 is	 a	 method	 of	 rating	 transparency	 in	 respect	 to	
sovereign	wealth	 funds.	Pertaining	 to	government-owned	 investment	 vehicles,	
where	there	have	been	concerns	of	unethical	agendas,	calls	have	been	made	to	
the	larger	“opaque”	or	non-transparent	funds	to	show	their	intentions.	As	of	March	







9  http://www.turan.az/Default_en.asp 
 















additional	 information.	 There	 are	 different	 levels	 of	 depth	 in	 regards	 to	 each	
principle;	 judgment	of	 these	principles	 is	 left	 to	 the	discretion	of	 the	Sovereign	
Wealth	Fund	Institute.	Principles	of	the	Linaburg	-Maduell	Transparency	Index	are	
the	following:	the	fund	provides	history	including	the	reason	for	creation,	origins	




guidelines	 in	 reference	 to	 ethical	 standards,	 investment	 policies,	 and	enforcer	





pertaining	 to	 the	 Linaburg-Maduell	 transparency	 index.	The	 respective	 scores	
are	9	for	Azerbaijan,	5	for	Russia,	and	2	for	Kazakhstan.	Of	course,	this	is	a	result	
of	 the	willingness	 of	 countries	 (governments)	 to	 disclose	 information	 about	 (i)	
scale	of	the	fund,	(ii)	learning	and	harmonization	with	transparency	tools,	and	(iii)	




SOFAZ and civil society sector
The	experience	of	interaction	between	the	Fund	and	civil	sector	has	a	unique	
sense.	A	well-known	EITI	 initiative	 is	 a	main	 factor	 here.	 Because	 of	 EITI,	 in	
the	last	7	years	SOFAZ	gained	valuable	experience	of	cooperation	with	the	civil	
sector	 of	Azerbaijan,	 which	 ultimately	 improved	 the	 image	 of	 the	 Fund	 in	 the	
eyes	of	both	the	local	community	and	the	world	community.	It	should	be	noted	
that	of	more	than	30	countries	involved	in	EITI,	perhaps	only	in	Azerbaijan	the	























has	 developed	 smoothly.	 There	were	many	 discussions	 about	 EITI	 prospects	
and	 the	nature	of	 interaction	on	ensuring	 transparency	 in	 the	extractive	sector	
between	 government	 and	 NGOs.	 Even	 today	 parties	 still	 have	 a	 number	 of	
disagreements	regarding	information	detailing	EI	companies’	payments,	as	well	
as	 the	 role	 of	NGOs	 in	 this	 issue.На	латинице	NGOs	 still	 have	 a	 number	 of	
complaints	and	dissatisfactions	related	to	the	government	and	particularly	with	











According	 to	 the	Order	 dated	 February	 24,	 2006,	№	 42	 “Azersu”	 Joint	 Stock	









that	 the	promotion	of	NGOs	 in	monitoring	 is	 in	 the	 interests	of	 the	Fund	also,	
which	is	high	in	the	ratings	of	good	and	transparent	governance	and	tries	to	hold	
this	position.
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Conclusion




that	 is,	 pre-distribution	 of	 budget	 resources	 over	 time.	 This	 kind	 of	 revenue	
management	is	useful	for	moderating	state	expenditures	and	ensuring	long-range	
macro-economic	 stability.	 In	 the	 most	 concise	 form,	 the	 functions	 of	 SOFAZ,	




from	politicians.	Thus,	with	 respect	 to	 the	 importance	of	 the	mission	of	 the	oil	
funds,	it	must	be	mentioned	that	many	of	them	continue	to	suffer	from	ineffective	
management	 and	especially	 from	 the	obsolete	macroeconomic	 instruments	 in	
the	hands	of	the	government.
The	 efficiency	 gap	 in	 the	 management	 of	 oil	 money	 in	 Azerbaijan	 is	
enormous.	Improvements	need	to	be	made	in	the	oil	money	accumulation,	saving	
and	 spending	 processes	 so	 that	 this	 short-term	 national	 resource	 can	 better	
serve	the	long-term	development	needs	of	the	nation.	The	necessary	changes	
include	redefining	and	streamlining	 the	Oil	Fund	 in	parallel	with	 improvements	


















long-term	 interests,	 then	 strategies	 for	 portfolio	 investments,	 transfers	 to	 the	
state	budget	and	public	investment	projects	must	be	adopted	and	implemented.	
The	Fund	 is	not	directly	 responsible	 for	ensuring	economic	growth,	supporting	
macroeconomic	equilibrium,	or	deficit	of	public	finances.	In	this	sense,	the	scope	
and	range	of	action,	mutual	liabilities	between	government	agencies,	and	finally,	
fear	of	 the	 fund’s	 failure	of	 the	plan	 is	much	smaller	 than,	 for	example,	 in	 the	
Finance	Ministry.	
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The	 improvements	 regarding	 the	 development	 of	 the	 institutional	 and	
legal	 framework	 will	 address	 and	 make	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 proposed	
financial	 strategy	 for	 the	Oil	 Fund	 possible.	This	will	 include	 the	 development	
of	instructions,	guidelines	and	standards	for	portfolio	investments	as	well	as	the	
rules	and	standards	 for	 transfers	 from	 the	Fund	 to	 the	state	budget	and	other	
domestic	 public	 and	 private	 uses.	 The	 recommended	 institutional	 and	 legal	
improvements	are,	on	the	other	hand,	based	on	the	existing	situation	and	current	
practices,	and	have	political	 feasibility	 implications	 for	 the	suggested	changes,	




simple	 reason	why	natural	 resource	 revenue	 funds	don’t	 usually	 contribute	 to	
better	 fiscal	 policy	 in	 those	 countries	 which	 are	 heavily	 dependent	 on	 oil-gas	




of	natural	 resource	 revenues	 relative	 to	 the	 ideal	 levels	of	expenditure	of	any	
given	government.	These	adverse	effects	are	strongest	when	political	divisions	




how	much	 to	 consume,	 i.e.	 allocate	 for	 state	 budget	 expansion.	This	 is	 not	 a	





and	SOFAZ	 active’s	 forecasting),	 empirical	 evidence	 and	 expert	 opinions,	 we	
presume	that	transfers	from	SOFAZ	to	the	state	budget	in	Azerbaijan	shouldn’t	
exceed	30%	of	the	total	SOFAZ	assets	regarding	its	own	budget	receipts.	
The	 status	 of	 Oil	 Fund	 of	 Azerbaijan	 is	 off-budget	 organization,	 such	 as	
the	State	Social	Protection	Fund.		In	this	sense,	the	reflection	of	the	budget	of	
SOFAZ,	 its	discussion	and	approval	by	parliament,	 along	with	 the	Foundation	











of	 taxes.	As	noted	by	 the	government,	 reduction	of	 income	of	 the	Fund	was	a	












underlines	 the	 importance	 of	 focusing	 primarily	 on	 the	 global	 financial	market	
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Recommendations 
1.	 SOFAZ’s	activities	should	be	regulated	with	law	status	regulatory	acts;






5.	 SOFAZ	 has	 to	 frame	 new	 strategy	 encompassing	 long-term	 asset	
management	and	indices	issues;
6.	 The	 Government	 should	 link	 SOFAZ’s	 asset	 management	 policy	 with	
general	fiscal	and	macroeconomic	policy.	
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Addendum 1. SOFAZ (Azerbaijan) compliance with Santiago principles































































































































































































































































































































Addenda 2. Santiago Compliance Index
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The National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
(NFRK): From stress-test to global future 
Yelena Kalyuzhnova
The	Centre	for	Euro	Asian	Studies,	University	of	Reading,	UK.
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sectors.	 In	 Kazakhstan,	 such	 a	 fund	 (the	 National	 Fund	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	
Kazakhstan	 (NFRK))	was	established	 in	2000,	when	 the	oil	prices	were	 rising	
and	an	economic	recovery	was	on	a	map	for	the	Kazakhstani	economy.	This	fund	
operates	as	both	a	stabilisation and a savings fund.	
The	 first	 test	 for	 the	NFRK	was	 the	 2007-2009	 financial	 crisis,	 where	 the	
NFRK	“saved”	the	economy	and	guaranteed	its	speedy	recovery.	It	is	important	
to	emphasize	the	proactive	stance	of	the	government	to	protect	some	key	sectors	
of	 the	 economy	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 implications	 to	 the	 local	 economy.	 The	
consequences	of	the	crisis	will	clearly	result	 in	changes	in	 investment	portfolio	
strategy	as	well	as	in	the	general	rules	and	principles	of	functioning	of	the	fund,	
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Kazakhstan	has	discussed	the	need	to	have	a	long-term	vision	and	determination	





for	 a	 period	 –	 to	 use	 resources	 in	 the	 fund	 to	 help	 repair	 the	 damage	 to	 the	
domestic	 economy.	Time	will	 tell	 how	 efficient	 these	 latter	 involvements	 have	

















more	stability	and	economic	 resilience	should	be	 taken	 into	account	when	 the	
Kazakhstani	 government	 is	 designing	 the	 investment	 portfolio	 strategy	 of	 the	
NFRK	for	the	near	future.
Fourth,	although	Kazakhstan	did	not	accept	(no	one	from	the	officials	in	the	













and	 timing	 of	 revenue,	 progressivity	 and	 adaptability,	 administrative	 simplicity	
and	 enforceability	 as	 well	 as	 international	 competitiveness.	 The	 Kazakhstani	
government	needs	to	reassess	its	risk	preferences	and	its	willingness	to	share	
them	with	the	investors	in	the	oil	and	gas	sector	after	the	recent	crisis.	
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1. Context and importance of the problem1
Oil	revenues	offer	important	opportunities	to	enhance	economic	development.	



















The	governments	of	 resource-rich	countries	 face	 the	challenge	of	devising	
policies	 that	can	effectively	channel	 “income	transfers	 to	governments	and	the	
inflow	of	foreign	exchange	from	foreign	investments.”	(Kalyuzhnova,	2002:	79).






sectors.	 In	 Kazakhstan,	 such	 a	 fund	 (the	 National	 Fund	 for	 the	 Republic	 of	
Kazakhstan	 (NFRK))	was	established	 in	2000,	when	 the	oil	prices	were	 rising	
and	an	economic	recovery	was	on	the	map	for	the	Kazakhstani	economy.	This	
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In	 this	 context,	NFRK	 identifies	as	a	 tool	 that	may	help	 in	addressing	 two	
specific	problems	associated	with	oil	revenues--the	unpredictability	and	volatility	
of	world	market	prices,	and	the	concern	to	save	part	of	the	revenues	for	future	
generations—“The	 Permanent	 Income	 Hypothesis”	 (PIH).	 In	 this	 context,	 this	
fund	may	 serve	 as	 a	 form	 of	 “commitment	 mechanism,”	 thus	 substituting	 for	
the	 IMF	commitment	mechanism.	A	 further	 problem	could	 in	 principle	 also	be	
mitigated	by	oil	funds:	“Dutch	Disease.”


















time,	a	part	of	 the	Santiago	principles	 initiative	for	SWF	along	with	other	 large	
SWF	like	other	world’s	largest	funds	of	Libya,	Brunei,	Malaysia,	Hong	Kong,	etc.	
It	 is	of	paramount	 importance	 that	 the	government	of	Kazakhstan	will	produce	
some	substitute	governance	guidelines	to	Santiago	principles	for	the	NFRK,	es-
pecially	with	regards	to	the	fund’s	investment	strategy	in	the	years	ahead.	
2. Critique of policy option(s)
In	Kazakhstan,	the	oil	fund	(the	National	Fund	of	the	Republic	of	Kazakhstan	







The	 NFRK	 invests	 in	 liquid	 foreign	 equities,	 and	 will	 be	 capitalized	 by	
corporate	 income	 taxes,	 VAT,	 royalties,	 bonuses,	 and	 Kazakhstan’s	 revenues	
from	 production	 sharing	 agreements.	 Initially,	 the	 Fund	 had	 a	 long-term	
investment	 function-saving	portfolio	 (75%)	and	a	smaller	stabilisation	 function-
saving	 portfolio	 (25%),	 and	 later	 these	 figures	were	 altered	 to	 80%	 and	 20%	
respectively.
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2.1 Economic context 
The	rules	governing	the	accumulation	and	use	of	resources	in	oil	funds	differ	
widely.	The	differing	features	of	the	funds	must	be	understood,	in	part,	in	light	of	
the	economic	situation	of	each	country,	which	 results	 in	varying	priorities.	 It	 is	
useful	to	analyse	the	rules	governing	the	NFRK.
First,	 the	Kazakhstani	government	and	 the	 international	agencies	consider	
the	estimated	 life	of	 the	hydrocarbon	deposits	as	a	decisive	argument	 for	and	
against	placing	 the	 funds’	 investment	portfolio	abroad,	whence	 income	will	 be	
accrued	on	the	PIH.	Originally,	given	the	scale	and	pace	of	exhaustion	of	reserves	












(27%),	which	 is	well	above	 that	of	other	 transition	economies.	That	Kazakhstan	
has	drawn	heavily	from	abroad	for	its	capital	finance	may	be	implied,	in	part,	by	
its	high	ratio	of	external	debt	to	GDP	–	in	2004	68.9%,	which	of	course	triggered	
Kazakhstan’s	 exposure	 during	 the	 2007-2009	 credit	 crisis.	 	 At	 that	 time,	 the	
moratorium	on	disbursements	from	the	”oil	fund”	was	in	force,	hence	the	Kazakhstani	
government	was	not	achieving	its	high	investment	rate	through	the	use	of	its	fund.	
2.2 Mapping goals to national priorities
This	economic	context	 in	Kazakhstan	helps	one	to	understand	the	specific	
design	 of	 the	 oil	 fund.	 The	 NFRK	 is	 designed	 to	 save	 resources	 for	 future	
generations	and	avoid	undue	pressure	on	the	domestic	economy	-	and	layered	
on	this	is	a	stabilization	function.	President	Nazarbayev	made	clear	at	the	outset	
that	 resources	 would	 not	 be	 spent	 on	 covering	 current	 expenses,	 but	 would	
accumulate	 in	 the	NFRK	for	 future	generations,	as	well	as	for	 the	contingency	










the	republic’s	budget	 from	major	companies	operating	 in	 the	raw	materials	(oil	
and	gas)	sector.	In	2003	the	fund	began	accumulating	proceeds	from	the	sale	of	
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state	property.	In	2008,	the	fund’s	reserves	exceeded	US$	27.4	bln.	(see	Figure	
1).	 However,	 since	 2009,	 according	 to	 the	 National	 Bank	 of	 Kazakhstan	 the	
assets	in	NFRK	have	fallen	to	US$	26	bln.	Kazakhstan	has	been	drawing	heavily	
on	 its	 rainy-day	 fund	as	 it	 attempts	 to	 stabilize	 its	 economy.	Overall,	 in	 2009,	
profitability	of	both	portfolios	was	7.31%	(where	stabilisation	and	saving	portfolios	
were	1.24%	and	10.19%	respectively).		(See	Figure	2)
Figure 1. NFRK, 2000-2009, US$ mln 
Source: NFRK annual reports.
Throughout	 the	 years	 since	 the	 NFRK’s	 conception	 we	 could	 observe	 a	
steady	increase	in	its	market	value	(see	Figure	2). 





































106                                                                                                                                   
The	differing	 roles	and	objectives	of	national	governments	are	 reflected	 in	

























lie	 in	 reinforcing	 the	 transparency,	 implementation,	and	credibility	of	 key	fiscal	
rules	–	thus	addressing	at	the	source	a	number	of	the	institutional	weaknesses	
that	may	lie	behind	the	poor	performance	of	many	resource-rich	economies.








2		It	 is	 important	to	note	that	already	at	 the	present	stage	the	management	of	 the	fund	could	
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disclosure	requirements	are	limited,	“...a	further	enhancement	of	the	Principles	
and	the	surrounding	governance	framework	will	be	mandatory	in	order	to	alleviate	











National	 Bank	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Kazakhstan	 were	 asked	 by	 the	 author	 why	
Kazakhstan	did	not	participate	 in	 the	Santiago	2008	meetings	as	well	as	why	











in	 the	 SWF.	 Transparency	 in	 the	management	 of	 oil	 revenues	 is	 essential	 to	
prevent	 a	 few	 interest	 groups	 from	 appropriating	 oil	 resources	 by	 allowing	 a	
democratic	debate	and	avoiding	corruption	and	waste	of	public	resources.	Part	
of	 this	 initiative	 is	 to	 increase	 transparency	with	 respect	 to	 revenues	by	 those	
host	country	governments.	Resource	revenue	transparency	has	been	advocated	
by	 international	financial	 institutions,	 including	 the	 IMF	 (2004).	The	concept	of	




Five	 dimensions	 of	 transparency	 deserve	 particular	 attention	 in	 this	
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2.3 Definition of goals
In	Kazakhstan	 the	main	objective	 for	 the	management	of	NFRK	 is	defined	
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year	periods.	These	changes	aim	to	strike	a	balance	between	meeting	current	
development	needs	and	providing	a	savings	cushion	for	future	generations.	The	


















Since	 the	 crisis	 began	 in	 2007	 the	 political	 establishment	 has	 been	more	
involved	in	governance	of	the	NFRK.	
2.5 Public availability of information
In	terms	of	public	availability	of	information,	in	the	first	years	of	establishment	
of	the	NFRK	the	population	in	Kazakhstan	was	largely	unaware	of	its	existence.6 
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designed	to	be	nationally	representative.7 
The	 survey	 also	 included	 questions	 relating	 to	 individual	 well-being8. The 
questions	related	to	life	satisfaction	as	well	as	the	impact	that	the	reforms	have	
had	on	 individual	 perceptions	of	well-being	which	allows	a	 clear	 picture	 to	be	
drawn	and	links	between	individual	well-being	and	existence	of	oil	funds.
From	the	question Do you know about the existence of the National Fund of 
Republic of Kazakhstan?	We	learned	that	45%	of	the	Kazakhstani	population	do	
not	have	any	idea	about	NFRK;	however,	in	the	2010	survey	this	figure	declined	
to	 30%.	 In	 2010	 through	 the	 regional	 analysis	we	 found	 out	 that	 the	majority	
of	unawareness	is	concentrated	in	the	regions	of	Mangistau	(54%),	Karaganda	




existence	of	 the	NFRK,	we	 found	 that	 the	 largest	percentage	(60%)	of	people	
with	primary	education	are	not	aware	of	the	existence	of	the	NFRK,	although	this	
result	is	based	on	the	interviews	of	a	small	group	of	respondents.	





To what extent does the National Fund of Republic of Kazakhstan influence your 














were	 asked	 where,	 from	 their	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 oil	 money	 should	 be	 spent9.	
From	 the	 6	 possible	 answers	 (health	 care,	 economy,	 oil	 and	 gas,	 agriculture,	
welfare,	and	population)	which	could	be	chosen	as	single	as	well	as	multiple,	
the	most	 popular	 answers	were	 in	 2010	 “health	 care”	 (48.2%),	 “social	 sector”	
7		For	the	methodology	of	the	survey	please	see	Chapter	1	in	Kalyuzhnova	(2008).
8		It	includes	information	on	income,	expenditures,	the	nature	and	quality	of	housing,	and	other	
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(38.6%),	“economy”	(32.9%)	and	“population”	(11.7%).	This	proved	the	point	that	
the	population	 thinks	about	 the	present	day	and	perceives	 the	oil	wealth	as	a	
blessing	of	today	rather	than	tomorrow.	In	particular,	an	interesting	fact	is	that	the	
answer	“oil	and	gas	sector”	received	the	support	of	only	4.9%	of	the	population.	
In	 the	Akmolinskaya	 region,	 respondents	wanted	 to	put	oil	money	 into	 the	







answers	 for	 the	 region)	 strongly	 supported	 this	 option.	The	 respondents	 from	
the	 Mangistau	 region	 in	 particular	 wanted	 to	 distribute	 oil	 money	 among	 the	
population	 (57.5%;	 37.5%	 in	 2010	 from	 the	 total	 respondents’	 answers	 of	 the	







satisfied	 with	 the	 provision	 of	 unemployment	 benefits.	 Similarly,	 70%	 are	 not	
satisfied	with	the	functioning	of	the	health	sector.		
“Unfinished	 higher	 education”	 as	 well	 as	 “higher	 education”	 groups	 of	
respondents	 would	 like	 to	 invest	 the	 assets	 from	 the	 NFRK	 into	 the	 social	
sector	(50%	and	41.9%,	respectively).	Based	on	very	small	numbers	some	60%	
of	 respondents	with	 “primary	 education”	 only	would	 like	 to	 invest	 the	NFRK’s	
money	 in	 the	social	sector.	With	 respects	 to	health	care,	 there	 is	 in	general	a	
high	consensus	with	regards	to	investing	in	this	sector	(all	are	above	50%).		The	
“postgraduates”	group	 is	most	supportive	of	 investing	 the	assets	of	 the	NFRK	
into	the	“oil	and	gas	sector”	(14.3%).	The	investment	into	agriculture	is	relatively	
uniformly	supported	across	the	educational	groups	(approximately	a	quarter).	




These	 visible	 attributes	 of	 transparency	 are	 the	main	 arguments	 used	 by	 the	
management	of	the	fund	in	the	debates	about	transparency.
Since	 its	 inception,	external	audits	of	 the	NFRK	have	been	conducted	 (by 




An	 annual	 audit	 of	 the	 fund	 is	 prima	 facie	 evidence	 of	 transparency,	 but	
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it	 is	only	 the	 tip	of	 the	 iceberg	as	 regards	high	standards	of	governance.	 It	 is	
encouraging	 that	 in	 Kazakhstan	 increasing	 emphasis	 is	 being	 laid	 at	 present	
on	the	transparency	and	efficiency	of	 investment	processes	 in	 the	fund.	Close	
attention	 should	 be	 paid	 to	 compliance	 with	 the	 rules	 under	 which	 the	 fund	
was	set	up	and	to	diversification	of	investment	projects	within	the	areas	of	fund	
operations.
2.7 Appointment of officials and managers
Analysis	 of	 the	 NFRK	 highlights	 some	 structural	 weaknesses.	 The	 fund	
has	been	characterised	as	representative	and	participatory.	The	rule	is	that	the	
President	approves	all	the	members	of	the	board	and	all	of	them	are	government	
officials.	This	 strong	control	 by	 the	executive	branch	has	enabled	uses	of	 the	
fund	that	are	contrary	to	its	purposes.	The	official	explanation	for	this	is	that	the	
maturity	 of	 the	 society	 is	 quite	 rudimentary	 and	 by	 allowing	 other	 people	 (for	
example	the	parliament)	to	decide	the	strategy	for	using	the	oil	fund,	control	over	
the	oil	wealth	could	be	 lost.	 If	 transparency	of	 the	oil	 fund	 is	 to	be	established	















of	 the	Middle	East	 and	Russia	 (see	Table	 1).	 Initially	when	 the	 crisis	 started,	
the	Kazakhstani	government	was	reluctant	to	use	the	assets	of	the	NFRK,	but	
since	the	crisis	was	becoming	deeper	and	deeper	the	government	of	Kazakhstan	
“opened”	 the	NFRK	and	 took	 the	$10	bln	 (9.5%	per	 cent	of	GDP)	which	was	
used	for	stabilization	of	the	financial	system,	support	of	the	housing	programme,	
SMEs	 and	 industrial	 innovation	 development	 (anti-crisis	 plan)	 (see	 Table	 2).	














on	 the	NFRK	yet,	but	by	 the	author’s	estimations,	 the	equity	portfolio	held	by	
NFRK	may	have	lost	approximately	US$1	mln	since	2008,	reducing	the	overall	
portfolio	by	around	0.64%.			There	are	clearly	a	number	of	factors	posing	potential	
risk	 to	 the	 growth	 of	 the	 NFRK	 in	 the	 near	 future,	 namely:	 commodity	 price	




higher	 returns.	By	 the	end	of	2009,	 total	assets	were	around	$26.2	bln.	What	
are	the	growth	prospects	for	the	NFRK?	Based	on	the	data	from	the	Ministry	of	
Economy	in	2009-2012	the	receipts	 to	 the	NFRK	are	expected	to	be	$9.3	bln;	
$10.7	bln;	$11.2	bln,	 respectively,	which	 reveals	 that	 the	NFRK	will	be	still	an	
important	player	 in	 the	years	ahead	both	domestically	and	 in	 the	 international	
financial	market.	




will	 remain	an	external	one	rather	 than	being	oriented	 towards	more	domestic	
involvement	(as	was	initially	thought	by	some	analysts	and	observers).	Over	time	
the	external	insurance	role	will	doubtless	need	to	be	rebuilt	also,	to	guard	against	
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Table 1.  The world’s largest SWF









SAMA Saudi	Arabia 300 Yes	(observer)
Kuwait	Investment	Authority Kuwait 213 Yes
Investment	Corporation	of	Dubai	 UAE	(Dubai) 20-80 Yes
Qatar	Investment	Authority Qatar	 20-60 Yes
Libya	Investment	Authority Libya 20-60 No
Brunei	Investment	Agency Brunei 												10-50 No




National	Fund	 Kazakhstan ~22 No
Khazanah	Nasional	Berhad Malaysia ~18 No
East Asia ~585







Temasek	Holdings	 Singapore	 ~108 Yes
Korea	Investment	Corporation Korea ~20 No
National	Stabilisation	Fund	 Taiwan ~15 No
Others ~138
Government	Future	Fund	 Australia	 ~49 Yes
Alaska	Permanent	Fund US ~38 No
Permanent	University	Fund	 US ~20 No
New	Mexico	State	Investment	 US ~16 No





Source: The classification is taken from R. Beck and M. Fidora, “The Impact 
of Sovereign Wealth Funds on Global Financial Markets”, Review of European 
Economic Policy (2008).
“The	banking	crises	in	Kazakhstan,	Kuwait,	Qatar,	Nigeria	and	Russia	raise	
questions	 about	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 stabilization	 mechanisms	 in	 resource	
rich	 countries,	 and	 calls	 for	 a	 fresh	 look	 at	 domestic	 investment	 to	 finance	
economic	 diversification	 and	 development	 strategy	 of	 resource	 rich	 countries”	
(Heuty	and	Aristi,	 2009:23).	Did	 the	NFRK	 fulfill	 its	 purpose	 in	 the	2007-2009	
crisis?	Today	we	could	say	that	 the	NFRK	worked	for	Kazakhstan,	despite	the	
fact	 that	 institutional	 quality	was	 not	 as	 high.	This	 reflected	 in	 part	 the	 strong	
leadership	of	 the	president	 of	 the	 country	 in	 favor	of	 prudent	policies	and	 the	
limited	involvement	of	the	public.	Another	factor	which	made	the	use	of	the	NFRK	
a	relative	success	is	that	Kazakhstan	is	an	upper-middle–income	economy;	this	














With	 regards	 to	 the	 educational	 level,	 respondents	 with	 a	 low	 level	 of	
education	were	generally	more	in	favor	of	the	Kazakhstani	government	spending	
money	 from	 the	NFRK	during	 the	2007-2009	crisis	 period	 (70-75%);	whereas	
the	respondents	with	a	higher	level	of	education	were	less	supportive	of	this	(60-
65%).




was	 found	 in	 the	Almatyinskaya,	Akmolinskaya	 and	Mangistau	 regions	 (52%-
58%).
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Table 2.  


























Distressed	Asset	Fund 1.0 0.6 Capital	provided	from	budget.








the	 NFRK	 provided	 to	 the	 Kazakhstani	 economy	 during	 2007-2009	 crisis.	An	
interesting	implication	of	the	success	of	the	use	of	the	NFRK	by	the	Kazakhstani	
authorities	has	been	expressed	in	the	strong	opinion	of	support	by	the	respondents	
across	 the	 regions	 for	 the	 greater	 governmental	 (state)	 prominent	 role	 in	 the	
economic	 life	of	Kazakhstan	 (the	actual	question	was	Taking into account the 
recent financial crisis, do you consider that the Kazakhstani economy requires 
stronger government control?) Almost	 90%	 of	 respondents	 supported	 greater	
government	control	in	banking,	oil	&	gas,	manufacturing	and	education.
There	 are	 some	 doubts	 in	 the	 country	 about	 the	 complete	 effectiveness	
of	using	US$	10bln;	mainly	 that	not	all	 the	money	 is	still	 “implemented”	 to	 the	
economy.	There	is	certain	criticism	that	the	NFRK	was	“forced”	to	buy	securities	
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in	the	Kazakh	Tenge	denomination	(5	bln	KZ	Tenge)		issued	by	Samryk-Kazyna	
and	KazAgro,	and	by	 this	 the	NFRK	has	now	two	parts	 (a	KZ	Tenge	part	and	
a	hard	currency	part),	although	 the	Tenge	part	 is	not	 large	compared	with	 the	













a	massive	private	sector	boom,	 fuelled	by	capital	 inflows	 through	 the	banking	





around	 35%	 of	 Kazakhstani	 GDP.	 In	 addition,	 Kazakhstan	 has	 accumulated	
reserves	 abroad,	 which	 made	 the	 country	 attractive	 to	 foreign	 lenders.	 As	 a	
consequence	the	banking	sector	became	particularly	vulnerable	to	the	liquidity	
crisis	started	in	the	US	and	Europe.
“The	oil	wealth	accumulated	 in	 the	oil	 funds	was	central	 to	 the	authorities’	
response	 to	 the	 2008-09	 global	 financial	 crisis”	 (Goldsworthy	 and	 Zakharova,	
2010:3).	 In	 order	 to	 preserve	 its	 banking	 sector	 and	 boost	 the	 economy	 the	
Kazakhstani	government	did	not	have	a	choice	but	to	use	US$10	bln	from	NBRK	
to	 support	 the	economy	and	 recapitalize	 the	banking	system,	 to	 shore	up	 the	
domestic	 equity	market,	 and	 to	 push	 credit	 to	 small	 and	medium	enterprises.	










date	of	 resource-rich	countries	 in	operating	oil	 funds	demonstrates	empirically	
that	 these	 are	 no	 panacea	 for	 the	 “paradox	 of	 plenty,”	 but	 the	 Kazakhstani	







which	 should	 contribute	 to	 the	 sustainable	 development.	Among	 these	 goals,	
greater	 confidence	 in	 the	 transparent	management	 of	 the	NFRK,	 and	 greater	























and	 to	 leverage	 their	 economic	 impact	 through	 a	 strong	 influence	 on	market	
expectations.	
By	 establishing	 periodic	 auditing	 and	 analysis	 of	 the	 management	
performance,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 ensure	 the	 sustainability	 and	 efficiency	 of	 the	
management	 revenue.	The	 fund’s	assets	should	be	placed	abroad	 (to	provide	










with	 the	 risk	 to	 the	 investors.	 “The	 country	 experiences	 of	 Azerbaijan	 and	
Kazakhstan	suggest	that	aggregate	fiscal	discipline	is	essential	for	the	effective	




















that	was	 in	place	at	 the	 time	of	 their	signing…	Times	are	changing	and	 life	 is	
changing	the	entire	world,	and	state	interests	are	pushing	us	in	this	direction.	We	
have	to	work	more	thoroughly	and	constructively.”	Energy	Minister	Mynbayev	told	










function	of	 the	 fund	will	be	 implemented	 through	 the	guarantee	 transfer	 to	 the	





and	 is	one	of	 the	most	 important	 factors	 in	 the	governmental	economic	policy.	
Therefore	 the	New	Concept	 contains	 the	 following	 restrictions	with	 regards	 to	
using	the	assets	of	the	NFRK:	annual	expenditures	for	serving	the	state	debt	on	
average	during	the	decade	should	not	be	more	than	15%	of	the	income	to	the	
budget,	 including	 the	 transfer	 from	 the	NFRK.	Loans	 to	 the	quasi-state	sector	
from	the	NFRK	and	other	additional	transfers	are	prohibited.		
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3.2 Recommendations







allows	 for	a	 solid	 sense	of	 the	available	development	 financing,	which	 should	
also	help	calibrate	 the	medium	and	 long-term	fiscal	 framework.	This	approach	
assumes	that	governments	have	the	capacity	to	determine	and	adjust	long	term	
commodity	prices	independent	from	political	pressures”	(Heuty	and	Aristi,	2009).	
Thirdly,	 the	 fact	 that	 domestic	 investment	 for	 economic	 diversification	
provides	more	 stability	 and	 economic	 resilience	 should	 be	 taken	 into	 account	
when	the	Kazakhstani	government	is	designing	an	investment	portfolio	strategy	











the	creation	of	asset	bubbles	 like	 those	Kazakhstan	experienced	 in	 the	recent	
past.	Kazakhstan	and	 the	NFRK	need	 to	 reconsider	 their	perception	 to	GAPP	
and	if	not	accept	them,	at	 least	get	a	more	pragmatic	basis	for	the	investment	
strategy	of	the	NFRK	in	the	short	term.
In	 light	 of	 the	 recent	 crisis	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	Kazakhstan	will	 soon	 join	 the	
Santiago	Principles;	however,	it	is	crucial	that	the	Kazakhstani	government	and	
society	 would	 be	 able	 to	 recognise	 the	 importance	 of	 transparency	 towards	
international	markets	rather	 than	domestic	accountability	 to	citizens	as	well	as	
a	straightforward	framework	without	room	for	different	 interpretations.	It	should	
be	a	normal	 practice	 that	 the	NFRK	 is	 systematically	monitored	against	 good	
practice	and	international	benchmarks	to	make	sure	that	the	Kazakhstani	citizens	
benefit	from	their	hydrocarbon	sector	in	the	optimal	way.
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be	important	not	to	misuse	the	NFRK	in	strategically-oriented	investment	rather	
than	commercial	investment.	
Sixth,	 in	 its	 investment	 strategy	 the	 NFRK	 has	 to	 arrive	 over	 time	 at	 a	
diversification	 in	 its	asset	allocation	which	would	correspond	 to	 the	 longer-run	
needs	and	welfare	of	Kazakhstani	citizens.	This	will	mean	carefully	reviewing	how	
efficient	its	recent	domestic	resource	allocation	has	been,	following	the	crisis,	and	






Finally,	 at	 the	present	 time	Kazakhstan	already	has	a	history	 in	designing	





Goldsworthy	 and	 Zakharova,	 2010).	 The	 Kazakhstani	 government	 needs	 to	
reassess	its	risk	preferences	and	its	willingness	to	share	them	with	the	investors	
in	the	oil	and	gas	sector	after	recent	crisis.	
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5.	 See	 Annual	 Reports	 of	 National	 Bank	 of	 Kazakhstan	 at	 http://www.
nationalbank.kz	
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Appendices
Appendix 1. New Rules of NFRK
From	 July	 2006	 changes	 took	 place	 in	 the	 NFRK’s	 rules.	 New	 mid	 term	
strategy	with	formalised	method	of	the	balanced	budget	is	outlined	below:













So,	as	you	could	see	 from	equation	 (1.2)	 the	main	concern	 is	constant	A,	
which	 is	 set	 up	 by	 the	 parliament.	Although	 “by	 selecting	 various	 parameters	
for	 the	 rule”	 there	 is	a	hope	 that	 the	selection	will	be	driven	by	 “how	much	of	
the	volatility	 in	prices	and	quantities	will	be	transferred	to	the	economy	via	the	
fiscal	 framework”	 (World	 Bank,	 2005:35),	 the	main	 concern	 is	 remained:	 how	
independently	and	based	on	the	economic	sense	rather	than	on	a	political	one	
this	process	could	be.
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Appendix 2. Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP)—
Santiago Principles


























































































































































Source: IWG (2008) Sovereign Wealth Funds. Generally Accepted Principles 
and Practices. “Santiago Principles”. http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiago-
principles.pdf
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Short History, Mission and Type
Creation	 of	 the	 first	Russian	 sovereign	 fund,	 the	Stabilization	Fund	 of	 the	
Russian	Federation,	was	related	 to	 the	 idea	of	 institutionalizing	 federal	budget	
surplus	generated	in	the	form	of	balances	on	the	budget	accounts	with	the	Central	
Bank	 of	 Russia	 since	 2000.	 Understanding	 the	 situational	 nature	 of	 budget	
revenues	in	the	background	of	rising	oil	prices	in	the	world	market,	and	wishing	
to	avoid	a	proportional	growth	of	the	budget	expenditure	commitments,	the	RF	








budget	 balance	during	a	decrease	 in	 oil	 prices	below	 the	baseline.	According	
to	 the	RF	Ministry	of	Finance,	 “the	Fund	contributes	 to	stability	and	economic	
development;	it	is	one	of	the	main	instruments	of	binding	the	excessive	liquidity,	
which	 is	 reducing	 inflationary	 pressures	 and	 the	 dependence	 of	 national	
economy	 from	 adverse	 fluctuations	 of	 revenue	 from	 commodity	 exports.”	
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economic	situation.
Since	 in	 2005	 the	 Fund	 exceeded	 the	 level	 of	 500	 billion	 rubles	 (RUR	
1,387.8	bln),	a	part	of	the	assets	was	addressed	to	other	purposes,	namely	for	
the	payment	of	external	 debt	of	 the	Russian	Federation	 (RUR	643.1	bln)	and	
replenishment	of	the	deficit	of	the	Pension	Fund	of	the	Russian	Federation	(30	
billion	rubles,	see	Table	1).




















































































2004 522.3 240.8 175.5 106.0 – – – 522.3
2005 1387.8 663.4 507.3 217.1 643.1 – 30.0 1237.0
2006 1708.6 991.2 646.7 47.8 604.7 – – 2346.9
2007 1895.9 918.9 674.7 156.7 33.7 300.0 – 3849.1
Total 5514.6 2814.8 2004.1 527.6 1281.5 300.0 30.0
Source: RF Federal Treasury
In	2005,	at	the	expense	of	the	Stabilization	Fund,	repayment	of	external	debt	
of	Russia	was	made	in	the	amount	of	643.1	bln,	including:
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Figure 1. The total volume of the RF Stabilization Fund








the	Stabilization	Fund	of	 the	Russian	Federation,	 in	addition	 to	 federal	budget	
revenues	from	oil	production	and	export,	the	sources	forming	the	Reserve	Fund	
also	include	federal	budget	revenues	from	gas	production	and	gas	export.
Figure 2. Reserve Fund Total Assets Volume 













































































































































































































































































































in billion rubles in billion dollars
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The	National	Welfare	Fund	is	a	part	of	the	federal	budget	subject	to	separate	
accounting	 and	 management	 to	 ensure	 co-financing	 of	 voluntary	 retirement	
savings	of	 the	Russian	citizens,	as	well	as	 to	cover	 the	deficit	of	 the	Pension	
Fund	budget.
Figure 3. National Welfare Fund Total Assets Volume 
Source: RF Ministry of Finance
The	Reserve	Fund	actually	became	a	functional	successor	of	the	Stabilization	
Fund	as	a	part	of	the	federal	budget	with	separate	accounting	and	management	















Legal basis, accountability and reporting 
As	mentioned	above,	in	2003	the	Federal	Law	“On	Amendments	to	the	Budget	
Code	of	the	Russian	Federation	regarding	the	establishment	of	the	Stabilization	
Fund	 of	 the	Russian	 Federation”	 of	 23.12.2003	No.	 184-FZ	was	 adopted,	 on	
the	basis	of	which	in	2004	the	Stabilization	Fund	of	the	Russian	Federation	was	















































































































































































in billion rubles in billion dollars
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stipulated	fundamentals	of	the	Stabilization	Fund	and	its	management	procedure.
































of	 the	 Stabilization	 Fund	 was	 governed	 by	 a	 number	 of	 legal	 acts,	 the	most	
important	of	which	are:
•	 The	RF	Government	Regulations	No.	508	of	30.09.2004	and	No.	229	








of	Rules	 of	 assessment	 and	 transfer	 to	 the	Stabilization	Fund	 of	 the	Russian	
Federation	 of	 the	 federal	 budget	 surplus	 revenues	 and	 fund	 balances	 of	 the	
federal	budget	by	the	beginning	of	the	fiscal	year,”	and
•	 Order	of	the	RF	Ministry	of	Finance	No.	158	of	22.05.2006	“On	approval	
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of	 the	minimum	and	maximum	timelines	 for	 repayment	of	 the	debt	 liabilities	of	
foreign	 countries,	 in	 which	 the	 Stabilization	 Fund	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation	
assets	can	be	invested.”
Of	 particular	 interest	 are	 the	 RF	 Government	 Regulation	 No.	 508	 of	
30.09.2004,	 “On	 the	order	of	 the	Stabilization	Fund	of	 the	Russian	Federation	
assets	 management,”	 and	 No.	 229	 from	 21.04.2006	 “On	 the	 order	 of	 the	
management	of	funds	of	the	Stabilization	Fund	of	the	Russian	Federation.”	One	
of	 the	 key	 tasks	 in	 the	 first	 stage	was	 to	 set	 conditions	 for	 investment	 of	 the	
RF	Stabilization	Fund	by	the	Central	Bank	abroad	and	to	provide	at	least	some	
safeguards	 to	protect	 them	 from	claims	of	 foreign	creditors.	As	 investments	 in	
foreign	financial	 instruments,	federal	funds	lose	the	status	of	public	funds	and,	
accordingly,	any	state	jurisdictional	immunity.
The	 Regulation	 No.	 508	 of	 30.09.2004	 stipulated	 the	 following	 allocation	
of	 investments.	 The	 Fund	 assets	 were	 legally	 separated	 from	 the	 assets	 of	
the	 Central	 Bank1	 and	 were	 legally	 considered	 “commercial”	 investments	 of	
the	Russian	Federation	as	a	 legal	entity.	This	created	certain	 risks	 for	 foreign	
investments	of	the	Stabilization	Fund,	since	there	was	no	jurisdictional	immunity	
of	 the	Russian	 Federation	 in	 regard	 to	 those	 funds.	As	 a	 result,	 there	was	 a	
possibility	of	foreclosure	on	the	Stabilization	Fund	from	foreign	creditors.
The	 government	 feared	 the	 risk	 of	 foreclosure	 on	 these	 funds2,	 and	 the	
adoption	of	“on	the	procedure	for	managing	the	Stabilization	Fund	of	the	Russian	
Federation”	No.	229	from	21.04.2006	tried	to	give	them	the	status	of	funds	used	






























•	 the	 procedure	 of	 interaction	with	 the	 Federal	Treasury	 in	 carrying	 out	
transactions	with	the	accounts	of	the	Stabilization	Fund.
Monitoring	 of	 the	Russian	Finance	Ministry	 control	 functions	 over	 the	 use	
of	the	Stabilization	Fund	was	limited	to	the	duties	of	providing	quarterly	annual	
reports	to	the	Government	of	Russia	on	the	status	of	the	following	indicators:




•	 estimated	 income	 for	 the	allocation	of	 the	Stabilization	Fund	assets	 in	
the	accounts;	









revenues	of	 the	 federal	budget,	and	 the	procedure	 to	manage	 the	 funds	were	
radically	 amended.	 Relevant	 amendments	 were	 made	 with	 the	 Federal	 Law	
No.	63-FZ	of	26.04.2007	“On	Amendments	to	the	Budget	Code	of	the	Russian	
Federation	 in	 terms	 of	 regulating	 the	 budgetary	 process	 and	 bringing	 certain	






2.	 a	 National	 Welfare	 Fund,	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 co-financing	 voluntary	
retirement	savings	of	the	Russian	Federation	citizens,	as	well	as	to	ensure	the	
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Item	 2	 of	 art.	 96.9	 of	 the	 RF	 Budget	 Code	 established	 a	 procedure	 for	
estimation	of	 the	normative	values	of	 the	Reserve	Fund.	Under	 this	 item,	 it	 is	
assigned	 an	 absolute	 amount,	 assessed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 10	 percent	 of	 GDP	
planned	for	the	relevant	fiscal	year.
However,	a	large	part	of	the	provisions	of	Art.	96.9	of	the	RF	Budget	Code	
were	not	 set	 to	be	put	 into	effect	until	 2013.	The	 relevant	decision	was	 taken	
as	part	of	the	anti-crisis	measures	and	approved	by	the	Federal	Law	No.	314-
FZ	of	17.12.2009	 “On	Amendments	 to	Certain	Legislative	Acts	of	 the	Russian	
Federation”	in	connection	with	the	Federal	Law	“On	the	federal	budget	for	2010	
and	the	planned	period	of	2011	and	2012.”
Before	2013,	while	 the	 revenue	 from	 the	Reserve	Fund	management	was	
allocated	 to	 financing	 the	 budget	 expenditures,	 the	 procedure	 for	 the	 fund	
assessment,	stipulated	by	Item	2	of	Article	96.9,	could	be	ignored.	Also,	before	
2013,	 the	 RF	 Government	 could,	 without	 amending	 the	 federal	 law	 on	 the	
federal	budget,	make	decisions	on	the	use	of	 the	Stabilization	Fund	and	other	
balances	 of	 the	 federal	 budget	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 payments,	 reducing	
debt	liabilities,	borrowing,	and	to	balance	the	federal	budget	execution	(including	
financial	 support	 of	 oil	 and	 gas	 transfers),	 including	 the	 excess	 of	 the	 total	
federal	budget	expenditures	within	increased	budgetary	allocations	of	the	federal	
budget	to	provide	intergovernmental	transfers	in	order	to	balance	the	budgets	of	















manner	 established	 by	 the	Government	 of	 the	Russian	 Federation.	Herewith,	
some	 responsibility	 for	managing	 the	Reserve	Fund	can	be	performed	by	 the	



















•	 The	 Order	 of	 the	 RF	 Ministry	 of	 Finance	 No.	 3	 of	 16.01.2008	 “On	
approval	of	 the	authorized	shares	 in	the	total	volume	of	financial	assets	of	 the	
Reserve	Fund	and	the	procedure	for	assessment	of	the	actual	authorized	share	
of	 financial	 assets	 in	 the	 total	 assets	 of	 the	Reserve	Fund	 to	 bring	 them	 into	
conformity	with	the	established	rates;”
•	 The	 Order	 of	 the	 RF	 Ministry	 of	 Finance	 No.	 26	 of	 24.01.2008	 “On	







•	 The	 Order	 of	 the	 RF	 Ministry	 of	 Finance	 No.	 24	 of	 24.01.2008	 “On	
approval	 of	 the	 established	 foreign	 currency	 structure	 of	 the	National	Welfare	
Fund	 and	 the	 Procedure	 to	 bring	 the	 actual	 foreign	 currency	 structure	 of	 the	
National	Welfare	Fund	into	compliance	with	the	established	rates;”	and














Fund	 are	 registered	 in	 special	 accounts	 of	 the	 federal	 budget	 opened	 for	 the	











and	National	Welfare	Fund	 in	 the	national	currency	of	 the	Russian	Federation	




















compiles	 and	 publishes	 in	 its	 website	 monthly	 summary	 reports	 available	 for	
public	 use.	 Published	 reports	 provide	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 total	 assets	 of	 the	
National	Welfare	Fund	as	of	 the	beginning	of	 the	 reporting	month,	 as	well	 as	
information	on	 the	assets	credited	 to	 the	 fund,	 their	placement	and	use	 in	 the	
reporting	month.
These	requirements	on	the	control	over	investment	of	oil	and	gas	revenues	











oil	 and	 gas	 revenues	 of	 the	 federal	 budget,	 income	 from	management	 of	 the	
Reserve	 Fund	 and	National	Welfare	 Fund”	 came	 into	 effect,	 under	which	 the	
following	requirements	for	the	Ministry	of	Finance	are	cancelled:















transfer	 as	 a	 source	 of	 funding	 the	 non-oil	 budget	 deficit,	 and	makes	 the	RF	
Ministry	of	Finance	and	the	Government	of	Russia	virtually	unaccountable	to	the	
State	Duma	in	terms	of	both	Funds’	assets	management.
However,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	RF	Ministry	 of	 Finance	 continued	 to	
publish	information	on	the	status	of	the	Funds	on	its	website	as	of	June	1,	2010.
Institutional base and institutional quality
Creation	of	the	RF	Stabilization	Fund	in	2004,	although	it	goes	beyond	the	
chronological	framework,	should	be	considered	in	the	context	of	the	overall	logic	
of	economic	 reforms	of	V.V.	Putin’s	 first	 term	 in	office	 (2000-2003),	of	 the	so-
called	 “Gref	 Program”7	 or	 “Strategy-2010.”	 In	 the	 framework	 of	 this	 program,	
radical	 tax	 reform	was	 carried	 out,	 the	 foundation	was	 laid	 for	 the	 new	 fiscal	
policy	 (transition	 to	 three-year	 budget	 planning),	 and	 the	 contours	 of	 major	
institutional	reforms	were	outlined	(administrative	reform,	judicial	reform,	reform	
of	natural	monopolies),	although	 the	 latter	ones,	unfortunately,	have	 remained	
largely	unimplemented.	In	addition,	when	making	economic	policy	decisions,	the	
then-recent	events	of	 the	crisis	 that	happened	 in	August	1998	were	taken	 into	
account,	leading	to	the	national	currency	devaluation,	the	enlarged	debt	burden	
on	the	budget	and	the	fear	of	uncontrolled	government	deficit.	In	particular,	the	






emerging	new	budgetary	commitments	 in	 the	case	of	a	short-term	 increase	 in	
oil	prices,	as	well	as	minimization	of	the	negative	impact	of	the	inflow	of	export	







Russia.	The	planned	 revenue	 to	 the	Fund	 for	 the	 relevant	 fiscal	 year	and	 the	
7	 	Named	after	the	Minister	of	Economic	Development	G.	O.	Gref.





























•	 Splitting	of	 the	Stabilization	Fund	 into	 the	Reserve	Fund	and	National	
Welfare	Fund	in	2008.	Even	during	the	worst	crisis	situation	in	Russia,	in	2008-
2009,	 and	 the	 high	 budget	 deficit	 in	 the	 subsequent	 years,	 the	 institutional	
conditions	allowed	the	National	Welfare	Fund	to	be	saved	as	a	sovereign	fund	
for	future	generations,	using	it	for	financing	the	federal	budget	deficit.	Obviously,	
if	 only	one	of	 the	Stabilization	Funds	had	been	maintained	during	 this	period,	





their	 main	 objective	 (RF	 Central	 Bank	 and	 the	 Russian	 Ministry	 of	 Finance).	
Involvement	of	private	professional	management	companies	(Russian	or	foreign)	
in	the	management	of	the	Funds	remains	politically	unacceptable.
•	 The	 lack	of	a	 legal	 framework	 for	 targeted	parameters	of	 the	National	
Welfare	Fund.	Despite	the	fact	that	the	objective	of	the	National	Welfare	Fund	was	
declared	the	“co-financing	of	voluntary	retirement	savings	of	Russian	citizens,”	
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as	well	as	“recovering	of	the	(deficit)	budget	of	the	Pension	Fund,”	the	required	




•	 The	 lack	 of	 institutional	 capacity	 to	 develop	 individual	 strategies	 for	
managing	the	assets	of	the	two	existing	Funds,	not	only	based	on	principles	of	
risk	management,	but	also	to	ensure	maximum	yield	at	a	given	level	of	risk.



















liabilities	denominated	 in	Euro,	or	GBP	1	billion	 for	 the	bonds	denominated	 in	
pounds	sterling.
From	2006	to	2007	the	requirements	underwent	minimal	changes	whereby	
the	volume	of	debt	 liabilities	 in	circulation	and	denominated	 in	pounds	sterling	
was	reduced	from		GBP	1	billion	to	0.5	billion.






used	 for	 placement	 of	 the	 Fund	 assets	 was	 established	 by	 the	 Order	 of	 RF	





The	 limits	 of	 permissible	 deviations	 of	 actual	 monetary	 structure	 of	 the	















During	 the	functioning	period	of	 the	Stabilization	Fund	the	procedure	of	 its	






Once	 the	Stabilization	Fund	was	split	 into	 the	Reserve	Fund	and	National	
Welfare	 Fund,	 the	 regulation	 of	 matters	 related	 to	 investment	 of	 their	 assets	








b)	 the	 share	 of	 financial	 assets	 authorized	 for	 allocation	 in	 the	 total	 Fund	












8	 	These	were	provided	 in	 the	RF	government	Regulation	No.	508	of	30.09.2004	and	 in	 the	
Annex	to	the	RF	government	Regulation	No.	229	of	21.04.2006.
9		List	of	normative	acts	regulating	the	management	of	investment	funds	policy	is	given	above.
144                                                                                                                                   




In	 addition,	 the	 two	Regulations	 (in	 the	 annexes)	 have	 approved	 detailed	
requirements	for	financial	assets	in	which	the	National	Welfare	Fund	and	Reserve	
Fund	assets	may	be	placed.









Thus,	 in	 2004	 and	 2005	 there	 were	 no	 investment	 transactions	 of	 the	
Stabilization	 Fund	 assets.	 During	 the	 period	 from	 July	 24,	 2006	 (the	 starting	
date	of	 investment	of	 the	Stabilization	Fund)	 through	December	15,	2007,	 the	




























































































1 -21.6 9.4 8.2 6.8 7.2 12.8 2.3 3.8 3.9 3.6 3.8 3.9 4.5 3.2 3.7 -3.6 9.4
2 -21.2 9.3 8.3 8.6 7.1 11.9 3.8 4.4 5.2 2.8 4.1 4.8 4.3 6.1 4.6 -2.1 8.6
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•	 debt	 liabilities	 of	 international	 financial	 organizations,	 including	
securities13;
•	 deposits	and	balances	 in	bank	accounts	with	 foreign	banks	and	credit	
organizations;
•	 deposits	 and	 account	 balances	 with	 the	 Central	 Bank	 of	 Russian	
Federation.




Thus,	 the	 share	 of	 foreign	 countries’	 debts	 should	 be	 from	 50	 to	 100%.	
Herewith,	such	assets	can	be	invested	exclusively	in	debt	instruments	in:	Austria,	
Belgium,	 Britain,	 Germany,	 Denmark,	 Ireland,	 Spain,	 Canada,	 Luxembourg,	
Netherlands,	USA,	Finland,	France	and	Sweden.
The	Regulation	contains	an	open	list14	of	recommended	international	financial	




IFC;	 International	 Bank	 for	 Reconstruction	 and	 Development,	 IBRD;	 Nordic	
Investment	Bank,	NIB;	and	International	Monetary	Fund,	IMF.
The	 right	 to	 define	 the	 currency	 structure	 of	 both	 Funds,	 as	 before,	 was	
provided	to	the	Ministry	of	Finance.	According	to	the	Sub-Item	A,	Item	4	of	the	
Regulation	 No.	 955,	 «On	 management	 of	 the	 Reserve	 Fund,	 the	 Ministry	 of	




12	 	The	 share	 of	 foreign	 government	 agencies	 and	 central	 banks	 assets	 should	 not	 exceed	
30%.	See	the	RF	Government	Decree	№	955	of	29.12.2007	“On	the	management	procedure	of	the	
Reserve	Fund”.
13	 	The	 share	of	 these	assets	 should	 be	15%.	See	 the	RF	Government	Decree	№	955	 	 of	
29.12.2007	“On	the	management	procedure	of	the	Reserve	Fund”
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the	procedure	for	bringing	the	actual	currency	structure	of	the	Reserve	Fund	into	
accordance	with	the	established	standard.

































•	 standards	 of	 the	minimum	and	maximum	maturity	 terms	 for	 the	 bond	




•	 denomination	 of	 debt	 is	 expressed	 in	 U.S.	 dollars,	 Euro	 and	 Pounds	












•	 the	 total	 volume	 of	 the	 Reserve	 Fund	 invested	 on	 deposit	 in	 foreign	
banks	or	credit	institutions	shall	not	exceed	25	percent	of	the	total	Reserve	Fund.
Requirements for placing assets of the National Welfare 
Fund
According	to	Art.	96.11	of	the	RF	Budget	Code,	the	National	Welfare	Fund	

































18	 	As	mentioned	 above,	 their	 rating	 has	 to	 be	 at	 least	 level	 “AA-”	 under	 the	 classification	
of	Fitch-Ratings	or	Standard	&	Poor’s,	 or	 at	 least	 level	 “АаЗ”	 under	 the	 classification	of	Moody’s	
Investors	Service.














of	 Fitch-Ratings	 or	 Standard	 &	 Poor's	 rating	 agencies	 or	 not	 below	 the	 level	












































Table 3. Annual Revenue from the Reserve Fund and National Welfare 
Fund management (over the year from 02.2008 to 02.2009),%
Currency Account currency In USD In RUR
USD 3.9 3.9 35.14
Euro 5.94 –4.99 23.67
GBP 9.58 –19.8 4.57
Total 5.41 –2.47 26.92
Source: RF Ministry of Finance
When	converted	into	Euro,	the	total	gain	would	amount	to	9.3%	per	annum,	
and	 into	 rubles	 -	more	 than	26%	per	annum.	The	main	 reason	 for	 the	 loss	of	













As	 mentioned	 above,	 the	 main	 objective	 of	 the	 RF	 Stabilization	 Fund	
establishment	 was	 institutionalized	 accumulation	 of	 surpluses	 of	 the	 federal	
budget	 under	 the	 circumstances	 of	 the	 external	 environment	 due	 to	 the	 high	
oil	 revenues.	 Oil	 and	 gas	 revenues	 include	 proceeds	 from	 taxes	 on	 mineral	
extraction	of	hydrocarbons,	export	duties	on	crude	oil,	natural	gas,	and	goods	
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produced	from	crude	oil.
Some	 oil	 and	 gas	 revenues	 are	 addressed	 toward	 financing	 current	





Table 4. Revenues and Expenditures of the Federal Budget in 2000-
2009. (% of GDP)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Expenditures	
(1)
14.2 14.8 18.9 17.8 15.8 16.3 15.9 18.1 18.2 24.7




11.7 13.1 15.1 14.1 13.5 13.6 12.7 14.6 11.8 11.2
Oil	revenue		
(2.2)





1.4 3 1.4 1.7 4.3 7.4 7.5 5.5 4.1 –5.9
Non-oil		deficit
(4)=	(2.1)–(1)
2.5 1.7 3.8 3.7 2.3 2.7 3.4 3.5 6.4 13.5
Note: when assessing the non-oil deficit in 2009, income from the man-
agement of the Reserve Fund and National Welfare Fund, which amounted to 
respectively 0.8% of GDP, were taken into account.
Source: Federal Treasury of Russia
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Figure 4. Stabilization Fund, Reserve Fund, the National Welfare Fund 
in 2004-2009, % of GDP
Note: The Stabilization Fund is a hypothetical fund equal to the amount of 
the Reserve Fund and National Welfare Fund
Thus,	during	the	period	of	a	favorable	external	market	situation,	the	presence	





the	 federal	budget	deficit,	 formed	due	 to	reduction	of	 the	budget	 revenues,	as	
well	 as	 due	 to	 adoption	 of	 the	package	of	 anti-crisis	measures.	However,	 the	
scope	of	the	budget	deficit	 in	the	RF	(like	in	many	countries	around	the	world)	
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Anti-crisis measures funding in 2008-2009
Financing	of	large-scale	measures	for	the	support	of	the	national	economy	
without	the	involvement	of	external	borrowing	in	2008-2009	was	possible	thanks	
to	 the	 reserves	accumulated	during	 the	economic	growth.	 In	 fact,	 oil	 and	gas	
revenues	became	the	main	sources	to	support	the	balance	of	the	federal	budget	




































488.5 205.0 2964.8 179.4
1830.5
(4.7%	of	GDP)


















* Balances are estimated at the exchange rates of January 1, 2009 and 
January 1 of  2010, accordingly.
Source: Federal Treasury
Formally,	the	assets	of	the	National	Welfare	Fund	were	not	used	to	finance	
the	 federal	 budget	 deficit	 and	 the	 financing	 of	 anti-crisis	measures.	However,	
starting	 from	October	 13,	 2008,	 the	RF	President	Dmitry	Medvedev	 signed	 a	
package	of	 laws	previously	 enacted	by	 the	State	Duma	and	approved	by	 the	
Federal	Council	on	the	stabilization	of	 the	financial	system	during	the	financial	




of	 the	 National	Welfare	 Fund;	 it	 was	 replenished	 with	 the	 ruble-denominated	
deposits	of	the	RF	Vnesheconombank.	In	the	future,	the	use	of	those	resources	
for	 the	 implementation	 of	 anti-crisis	 measures	 was	 already	 implemented	 by	







1.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 use	 of	 the	 Reserve	 Fund	 assets	 to	 cover	 the	










budget	 account	 is	 observed	 every	 time	when	 the	 government	 spends	money	
on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 existing	RF	 system	of	 the	Treasury,	which	 has	 budgetary	
accounts	with	the	Bank	of	Russia,	i.e.	those	withdrawn	from	the	monetary	supply.	
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From	our	point	of	view,	 the	most	 important	 impact	on	 the	population	 living	












not	play	the	role	 imposed	on	 it--	but	not	ensured	 in	 institutional	and	 legislative	
terms--	 as	 an	 instrument	 for	 the	 long-term	 solutions	 of	 the	pension	 system	 in	
Russia.	We	will	consider	the	tentative	options	of	the	National	Welfare	Fund	in	this	
area	in	the	final	section	of	this	memo.




155                                                                                                                                  





Table 6. Santiago Principles and Implementation thereof for the Rus-
sian Sovereign Wealth Funds





































































Therefore,	 as	 seen	 from	 the	 above	 estimates	 for	 the	 RF	 Reserve	 Fund,	









mentioned	 decision	 of	 the	RF	Government,	which	 has	 refused	 to	 provide	 the	
information	on	the	Funds’	status	for	public	disclosure	since	May	2010.
Perspectives and Predictability after the Global Economic Crisis
As	stated	above,	the	situation	with	the	dynamics	of	both	Russian	sovereign	
funds	 during	 the	 recent	 crisis	 is	 ambiguous.	At	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 crisis	 in	
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preservation	of	the	global	oil	prices	at	not	less	than	70	US	dollars	per	barrel).
National	Welfare	Fund	assets	were	not	directly	used	to	finance	the	federal	
budget	 deficit,	 and	 the	 assets	 spent	 in	 the	 context	 of	 an	 anti-crisis	measures	







times	of	 crisis,	 the	Fund	has	not	 suffered	 losses	 in	 ruble	 terms.	 Losses	were	
recorded	in	2010,	as	the	nominal	exchange	rate,	and	consequently,	ruble	ratings	
were	reduced,	affecting	the	fund	assets.	Similar	losses	were	observed	in	the	pre-
crisis	period,	when	 the	 ruble	was	also	 rapidly	strengthening	against	 the	major	
world	currencies.












of	 the	 Fund,	 one	 can	 propose	 its	 transformation	 into	 a	 savings	 pension	 fund	















3. With respect to both funds	-	principles	and	approaches	to	managing	the	
funds’	assets	should	be	differentiated.	 In	particular,	 the	National	Welfare	Fund	
should	 be	managed	 essentially	 on	 different	 terms	 than	 the	Reserve	 Fund.	 In	
other	 words,	 an	 authorized	 structure	 of	 assets	 and	 management	 mechanism	
should	be	revised.
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